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TAKING WARRANTS SERIOUSLY 
Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman 
ABSTRACT—Courts and commentators are increasingly concerned about 
police misconduct—searches and seizures that fail to comply with Fourth 
Amendment protections. Current doctrine attempts to deter such 
misconduct with the threat of excluding unlawfully seized evidence. The 
remedy of exclusion is weak, however, in large part because judges only see 
cases in which the defendant obviously is guilty. Despite years of proposals, 
the alternative of money damages is largely unavailable. The problem is 
exacerbated because Fourth Amendment law is notoriously uncertain. The 
combination of these three factors results in ineffective deterrence of Fourth 
Amendment violations. We propose to replace the failed deterrence model 
with a stringent ex ante warrant requirement. We make a novel case for 
warrants based on findings from the social sciences. The Court, rather than 
continuously weakening the warrant requirement, should reverse course and 
set warrants as the centerpiece of the Fourth Amendment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In theory and practice both, the two most contentious issues in search 
and seizure law today involve the questions of the proper remedy for Fourth 
Amendment violations and of whether police officials must obtain warrants 
before engaging in conduct covered by the Fourth Amendment.1 In recent 
years, the Supreme Court has handed down major decisions on each. The 
first issue reflects perennial dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule, as 
well as stasis regarding any satisfactory alternative. As to the second, what 
was once a “warrant requirement” is now a rule so laden with exceptions 
 
1  On remedies, compare Daniel M. Harris, Back to Basics: An Examination of the Exclusionary 
Rule in Light of Common Sense and the Supreme Court’s Original Search and Seizure Jurisprudence, 
37 ARK. L. REV. 646, 648–52 (1983), arguing that the Court went too far in adopting the exclusionary 
rule, with Yale Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 119, 123–26 (2003), defending the exclusionary rule and pointing to its salutary effect on police 
practices. As to the warrant requirements, compare Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First 
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 800–11 (1994), arguing that the warrant-preference model should be 
replaced with reasonableness analysis, with Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 
83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1471–72 (1985), arguing for a return to a stricter warrant requirement, and 
Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 854 (1994), 
supporting the warrant preference as a “triumph of rules over standards.” 
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that it best resembles a piece of Swiss cheese, a state of affairs increasingly 
accepted as the new normal. What seems to have occurred to almost no one 
is that the solution to the first problem is to shift direction entirely on the 
second.2 
There is no gainsaying animosity toward the exclusionary rule. There 
have always been critics of the notion that simply because the police obtain 
information in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the proper remedy is to 
exclude that evidence from a criminal trial, sometimes with the effect of 
dismissing charges altogether.3 Even so, the degree of hostility in recent 
Supreme Court decisions toward this longstanding rule has been quite 
breathtaking. In the 2011 decision in Davis v. United States, a 6–3 majority 
used language strongly suggesting that exclusion will move from being the 
usual remedy in Fourth Amendment cases to one employed only as a “last 
resort” when the “deterrence benefits of suppression . . . outweigh its heavy 
costs.”4 Yet what cannot be denied is that no alternative to exclusion has 
attracted sufficient support to see it implemented. Indeed, that very same 
Term, in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the Justices held 8–0 that the Attorney 
General had immunity from monetary damages for the pretextual detention 
of Abdullah al-Kidd under the material witness statute, one of many 
decisions immunizing officials for Fourth Amendment violations.5 There is 
a longstanding debate about whether money damages would be a better 
remedy than exclusion, given the latter’s costs, but in truth, any remedy for 
Fourth Amendment violations seems to be slipping away. 
On the issue of warrants, matters are only slightly more complicated. 
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court declared unequivocally what 
had long been understood: that searches without warrants were “per se 
 
2  There are a host of articles that argue for strengthening the warrant requirement or limiting warrant 
exceptions. See sources cited infra note 152. But these articles do not treat warrants effectively as 
remedies. William J. Stuntz’s wonderful Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 
881 (1991), is the primary piece that perceives the relationship between warrants and remedies. His, 
however, is largely a positive account of why (and in what form) we would retain a warrant requirement 
given certain remedial failings of the exclusionary rule and monetary damages. He does not present 
anything like the normative argument here. Other authors see the connection between warrants and 
remedies, though rarely do they recommend turning to warrants in the face of remedial failure. See, e.g., 
Louis Michael Seidman, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?) Demise of Criminal Procedure Liberalism, 
107 YALE. L.J. 2281, 2294–98 (1998) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997)) (linking warrants and remedies to the common goal 
of deterring Fourth Amendment violations); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth 
Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 296–98 (1984) (pointing out that the warrant requirement 
fulfills the same purpose as a remedy). 
3  See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661–62 (1961) (Black, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
Fourth Amendment does not require exclusion); People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) 
(arguing against an exclusionary remedy). 
4  131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011). 
5  131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084–85 (2011). 
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unreasonable.”6 Katz backed this up by invoking the specter of exclusion 
whenever a warrant was not obtained.7 Yet, as a matter of simple empirics, 
the vast majority of police actions covered by the Fourth Amendment occur 
without warrants. And doctrinally, this is somehow just fine. It often 
appears from reading the cases that each failure to obtain a warrant merely 
begets a new exception to the warrant requirement. In yet another 2011 
decision, Kentucky v. King, only Justice Ginsburg dissented from the 
Court’s decision that the exigency exception to the warrant requirement 
applies even if the police have created the exigency themselves by knocking 
and announcing their presence rather than simply obtaining a warrant when 
possible.8 Katz notwithstanding, the Justices do not seem to care about 
warrants, and for that matter, not many others do either. Some 
commentators rue the passing of a firm warrant requirement, and many note 
the incoherence of the body of law that replaces it, but in Fourth 
Amendment quarters warrants are a relic of a bygone age.9 
Part of the reason for the collapse of the warrant requirement is the 
apparent collapse of its intellectual underpinnings. Over the last few years, 
a theory first advanced by Telford Taylor, and then given great publicity by 
Akhil Amar, has been gaining primacy on the Court.10 Relying on history, 
that theory pries the two enigmatic clauses of the Fourth Amendment apart, 
rather than reading them holistically as the Katz Court did. The Fourth 
Amendment reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.11 
The historical argument gaining ground is that warrants, rather than 
being protections for individual liberty, were threats to it. At common law, 
if officials intruded into one’s affairs, one could bring a trespass suit. But if 
an official had obtained a warrant, immunity resulted. Under this reading, 
 
6  389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
7  See id. at 356–57. 
8  131 S. Ct. 1849, 1858 (2011); see id. at 1864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
9  The latter point is clear by looking at the dates of the scholarly articles arguing for a taut warrant 
requirement. See, e.g., Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the 
Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 502, 520 (1991) (criticizing the Court’s attack on the 
warrant requirement); Bradley, supra note 1, at 1468–70 (discussing a lack of clarity in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence); Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 29–37 (1991) (proposing replacing the many warrant exceptions with a limited exigence-
based model). 
10  See TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1969); Amar, supra 
note 1; see also Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 170 (2008) (citing Amar’s Fourth Amendment First 
Principles, supra note 1). 
11  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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the purpose of the second clause was only to prohibit “general warrants” 
that conferred too much immunity upon police officials. If police obtain a 
warrant that has this immunizing effect, then the warrant must meet the 
strict requirements of the Warrant Clause. Generally, however, warrants are 
not required by the Fourth Amendment, and police searches and seizures 
are governed only by the admonition in the first clause that they be 
“reasonable.”12 This theory, however, rests on shaky historical and practical 
grounds.13 Nonetheless, it is ascendant in Supreme Court decisions. 
Whether this is the cause of a vanishing warrant requirement or simply a 
convenient doctrinal excuse to dispense with it is difficult to say. 
This Article argues that the best answer to dissatisfaction on the 
question of Fourth Amendment remedies may well be to reverse course on 
the warrant requirement. The general preference in the law is for ex post 
remedies. William Stuntz emphasized this preference in a now-classic 
exploration of why we have a warrant requirement in the first place.14 Ex 
post remedies save litigation costs and are tailored to realities rather than 
possibilities. Most important, in theory, ex post remedies will achieve 
through deterrence the same avoidance of constitutional violations as will 
ex ante measures such as an injunction or a warrant. Deterrence has long 
been the Supreme Court’s central justification for the exclusionary rule. But 
for the reasons made apparent in Part I’s summary of the debate over Fourth 
Amendment remedies, an ex post regime—relying on the remedies of 
exclusion and money damages—has enjoyed only limited success in 
deterring police conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment. 
To achieve adherence to Fourth Amendment norms, this Article 
proposes that we return to taking the warrant requirement seriously. As Part 
II explains, in many areas of the law, if ex post remedies fail, the law turns 
to ex ante alternatives, such as licensing or even incapacitation. A warrant is 
just such an ex ante alternative, and Part II argues that it can enhance 
compliance with constitutional mandates for two particular reasons. The 
first—and the more traditional argument from law and economics—is that 
if there is a clear warrant requirement, then police officers will conform 
their behavior to the demands of the magistrates who must issue those 
warrants. There are perennial concerns that magistrates are “rubber 
 
12  See TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 21; Amar, supra note 1, at 772–80. 
13  For examples of the Court accepting all or part of this reasoning, see, e.g., Samson v. California, 
547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006) (finding suspicionless searches of parolees reasonable), and Wyoming v. 
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 306–07 (1999) (holding that warrantless search for contraband was 
reasonable). For criticism of the Taylor–Amar thesis, see, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the 
Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 571–90 (1999) (arguing that history does not 
support the reasonableness framework), and Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 228–29 (1993) (arguing that the warrant requirement better 
serves the Fourth Amendment’s purpose). One of us (Friedman) is writing a book on the Fourth 
Amendment that, among other things, challenges Justice Scalia’s version of the Taylor–Amar thesis. 
14  See Stuntz, supra note 2, at 887–88. 
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stamps,” granting warrants without serious scrutiny. We respond to those 
concerns in a variety of ways, including insisting that police officers not be 
allowed to shop for magistrates they believe will favor them. Judge 
shopping is almost universally deplored, and there is no reason it is so 
willingly tolerated in this area. Facing scrutiny from a magistrate is almost 
certainly calculated to avoid some searches that would not meet Fourth 
Amendment requisites. 
But even if magistrates do not exercise the scrutiny they should, there 
is a second reason that requiring warrants may enhance police compliance 
with the Fourth Amendment. Although some police officers no doubt wish 
to take action with no regard for constitutional and legal requirements, 
others will care more but still suffer from the ordinary failings of human 
beings. Police officials, like most people under pressure, can act in ways 
that seem initially reasonable but may, upon the reflection that takes place 
when they are forced to articulate their reasons, no longer seem so. Without 
regard to the quality of magistrates, a real warrant requirement will force 
some police officials to stop and think, and to articulate their reasons for 
intruding into someone’s liberty, thereby avoiding unreasonable intrusions 
in the first place. Literature from the social sciences offers support for this 
latter rationale in favor of warrants. There is evidence that a proposal like 
ours would have a real effect. Pittsburgh, operating under a consent decree, 
put in place a rigid reporting scheme for police searches. In response, the 
number of searches taking place dropped fairly dramatically, while the 
crime rates seem not to have changed in any meaningful way. 
Note that a return to warrants would not displace ex post remedies; it 
would only refocus the function they serve. Ex post remedies fail at present 
because the standards of police conduct are extremely uncertain. Moreover, 
judges, faced with a case where it is clear the search target possessed 
contraband or evidence, are understandably reluctant to see evidence 
excluded. This “ex post bias” is one of the chief aspects undermining the 
exclusionary rule as deterrent. As Part III explains, under a revitalized 
warrant regime, courts will be called upon to enforce a much brighter line: 
the warrant requirement itself. The very clarity of that line not only will 
recalibrate the effectiveness of ex post remedies; it often will reduce the 
need for them altogether because police, knowing that a violation of the 
bright-line warrant requirement will bring ex post relief, will hesitate to act 
without warrants. Indeed, knowing they must seek permission ex ante, they 
will not request warrants that will not be granted. In a sense, a firm warrant 
requirement makes the Fourth Amendment self-enforcing: its clear 
enforcement ex post will serve to deter Fourth Amendment violations ex 
ante by optimizing police conduct. 
The proposal here is a clear and simple one. Warrants should be 
required any time obtaining a warrant is feasible or, in other words, any 
time exigent circumstances are not present. Feasibility and exigency are 
both functions of technology, which operates in today’s world to favor 
106:1609 (2012) Taking Warrants Seriously 
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warrants. Police officials often benefit from advances in technology in their 
fight against crime, prominent examples being GPS location tracking and 
closed circuit television cameras (CCTV). But technology can also serve 
the interests the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect. For too long 
we have lived with a caricature of the warrant process: a detective pounding 
out a warrant request in triplicate on a battered Smith Corona, assuredly a 
time-consuming task almost impossible to meet in the fast-paced arena of 
police work. We do not live in that world, however, and have not for some 
time. In some instances, states have cut out the middleman, stationing 
judges on the scene at DUI checkpoints to issue warrants immediately if a 
suspect refuses a breathalyzer.15 If a magistrate is not on hand, technology 
can often fill the gap; telephonic warrants are increasingly commonplace.16 
Recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure enhance the 
ability to use electronic communications throughout the warrant application 
and return process.17 Police in Florida are using Skype to gain authorization 
to draw blood from drunk-driving suspects.18 In short, today’s technology 
makes obtaining permission from an official remote from the heat of the 
decision fast and easy. 
Given technological advances, it may even be possible to obtain the 
benefits described here without warrants so long as ex ante reason-giving 
by police officers is required. Recall the second benefit of the warrant 
requirement: that an officer may reach a different conclusion about the 
efficacy and propriety of searching if forced to articulate reasons for doing 
so in advance of searching. Although the proposal here focuses on warrants 
 
15  See Ken Thomas, Gov’t Urges ‘No Refusal’ Policy on Drunken Driving, NBCNEWS.COM (Dec. 
13, 2010, 3:44 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40646098/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/govt-
urges-no-refusal-policy-drunken-driving/. 
16  The literature on the use of technology to obtain warrants is blossoming. See, e.g., Donald L. 
Beci, Fidelity to the Warrant Clause: Using Magistrates, Incentives, and Telecommunications 
Technology to Reinvigorate Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 293, 296–99 
(1996) (arguing that technology makes it easier to obtain warrants); David A. Sklansky, Quasi-
Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1246–50 (2002) 
(discussing benefits of telephonic warrants); Slobogin, supra note 9, at 32–33 (discussing increasing use 
of telephonic warrants). 
17  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(d) (amending Rule 4 to allow a magistrate to issue a warrant “based on 
information communicated by telephone or other reliable electronic means”). Other amendments to Rule 
4.1 provide that a magistrate may file a duplicate copy received electronically as the original and for the 
transfer and modification of warrants via electronic communication. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4.1(b); see 
also FED. R. CRIM. P. 4.1(b)(4) (providing that issuance of a warrant based on information received by 
“reliable electronic means” can serve as an original); FED. R. CRIM. P. 4.1(c) (providing that absent bad 
faith, evidence from such a warrant may not be challenged based on the manner of issuance). For a 
summary of changes to the rules, see Letter from Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the 
Judicial Conference of the U.S. to Chief Justice John G. Roberts (Dec. 16, 2010), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Supreme Court 2011/Summary_of_Amendments
.pdf. 
18  See Sarah Lundy, Officers Connect to Judges with Skype, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 29, 2011, at 
B2; see also Stuntz, supra note 2, at 908 (proposing adoption of telephonic warrant procedures). 
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and the independent judgment of magistrates, to the extent that obtaining ex 
ante warrants is too difficult or costly, similar benefits may be achieved 
simply by having police make a record of what they are doing and why, 
before it happens. Officers can achieve this with voice dictation before they 
act, along with video recording of their actions. Video of this sort 
increasingly is being used in policing.19 It would be even simpler to have 
officers wear microphones so that they could narrate why they are acting 
immediately before they do so. Not only would this achieve some of the 
advantages of reporting and self-reflection, it also would provide a record to 
defense counsel to test police explanations against what ultimately occurs 
or is found in a search. William Stuntz has explained how this sort of ex 
ante record keeping could go a long way to avoid police perjury.20 
Taking warrants seriously in our technological age will require 
warrants in many circumstances in which they are not obtained at present. 
For example, as a matter of long tradition—driven by exigency and the 
difficulty of obtaining warrants—arrests have largely fallen outside the 
warrant requirement.21 Yet why should that be? The seizure of a person is 
one of the most invasive and coercive acts of the government. With 
technology readily available, arrests should not be made without a 
warrant—that is, the second opinion of a magistrate. And with that 
requirement, searches incident to a lawful arrest themselves effectively will 
be warranted. Similarly, although automobile stops will occur without 
warrants in most cases because of exigency, searching stopped vehicles 
should require warrants. Anytime a warrant can be obtained, it should be 
obtained. 
The same is true of administrative searches. In Camara v. Municipal 
Court, the Supreme Court extended the notion of what constitutes a 
warrantable search to cover administrative and regulatory searches.22 Since 
then, the requirement of such administrative warrants to assure regularity 
seems to have fallen by the wayside.23 But in these administrative contexts, 
such as police roadblocks, the use of warrants should be reinvigorated. 
Many commentators have made the case that in a properly considered 
regime, virtually all the warrant exceptions but exigency could be dispensed 
with. This still will leave many areas of policing unencumbered by a 
warrant requirement. Current “stop and frisk” practices provide an example, 
 
19  See Erica Goode, Video, a New Tool for the Police, Poses New Legal Issues, Too, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 12, 2011, at A14. 
20  See Stuntz, supra note 2, at 917. 
21  See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980) (distinguishing warrantless arrests from 
warrantless searches). 
22  387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967). 
23  See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427–28 (2004) (excepting information-seeking 
highway checkpoints from the warrant requirement); Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 
444, 454–55 (1990) (excepting drunk-driving checkpoints). 
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though we think that there, too, greater supervision might be apt. But within 
its plausible domain, warrants, taken seriously, will make a difference. 
Indeed, it is useful to disaggregate the term “warrant” to highlight the 
various ways in which we might take “warrants” seriously. First, traditional 
warrants, issued by magistrates and based on cause, should be required 
whenever police seek to conduct an investigative search and no exigency is 
present. Second, police forces should be required to obtain administrative 
Camara warrants from judicial officers before initiating programmatic or 
regulatory searches. Finally, even when exigent circumstances are 
present—such as those that generate an auto stop or a stop and frisk—
police should be required to utilize technology to obtain video and audio 
recording of police actions and their justifications, so that it is possible to 
use ex post review to determine whether those actions were in fact 
“warranted.” 
Finally, Part IV addresses the costs of this call for wider use of 
warrants. It no doubt is true that actually requiring warrants (instead of just 
claiming to do so rhetorically) will create a need to obtain many more 
warrants. Can this be done, and is it worth it? Part IV first makes the case 
that police officials are acting in violation of the Fourth Amendment at a 
frequency that justifies legal reform, or at least serious consideration of 
reform, if we are to take the constitutional mandate seriously. It then 
suggests that the number of additional warrants is not as great as it might 
seem, in part because under the warrant model, police will be deterred from 
even requesting warrants in many cases in which they presently search. 
Moreover, it is possible to expand our notion of a “magistrate” to make it 
easier to provide staffing for the greater number of warrants. Indeed, 
increasing the number of magistrates and regularizing their function would 
well enhance the efficacy of the warrant process. Part IV explains that given 
present technology, the warrant requirement can be met—and indeed, could 
be expanded into areas of policing presently immune from warrants. And 
even if obtaining warrants is costly or impossible, technology can and 
should be used to obtain records of why police act as they do and what 
precisely has occurred. The analysis in Part IV is suggestive, based on the 
very limited data that is available. Yet, despite these limitations, it is, to the 
best of our knowledge, the most comprehensive account to date of the costs 
and benefits of warrants. 
If we are to take warrants seriously, one additional change in the law is 
required, that dealing with the question of consent. It is already apparent in 
today’s world that one of the chief ways police officers avoid warrants is to 
obtain “consent” to search persons and places, particularly vehicles.24 
 
24  See Gerard E. Lynch, Why Not a Miranda for Searches?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 233, 235 (2007) 
(“Next to the pervasive automobile exception to the warrant requirement, consent is probably the 
leading justification offered for warrantless searches, and consent is unquestionably the leading rationale 
for searches undertaken without particularized probable cause or reasonable suspicion.”). 
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Consent is placed in scare quotes in the preceding sentence because 
virtually no one believes these searches are the product of a voluntary 
choice, which is what the doctrine presently requires.25 We offer data 
further supportive of the notion that “consent” searches are not voluntary. In 
light of the ability of coerced consent to undermine a warrant scheme, it too 
must be eliminated. One solution would be banning consent searches 
altogether, though it is not necessary to go that far. Rather, consent could be 
disallowed absent ex ante proof that evidence is likely to be found. Or, 
given the available technology, consent could be premised on the magistrate 
informing the target that consent must be totally voluntary. One suspects 
that under these circumstances, the requests for consent searches would go 
way down, and again, there is some data to support this conclusion. 
We do not purport to make a conclusive case for warrants. Such a case 
would require a detailed comparison between the costs and benefits of a real 
warrants system and the costs and benefits of all plausible alternatives, 
including the current system (with any plausible fixes). Try as one might, 
the absence of adequate data precludes such a comparison. Yet, we hope to 
demonstrate that there is a problem, and that a return to warrants—a 
solution that is arguably entirely in line with the proper understanding of 
the Fourth Amendment—deserves thoughtful consideration. 
I. ILLUSORY DETERRENCE 
The most prominent justification of the ex post remedies for violations 
of the Fourth Amendment is deterrence, but two other rationales have also 
been offered. First, remedies are sometimes deemed compensatory, as they 
return the injured party as much as possible to the state in which she rested 
before the violation.26 Second, the specific remedy of the exclusionary rule 
is said to preserve judicial integrity: although law enforcement may have 
violated the Constitution, courts avoid complicity by declining to admit any 
 
25  Many commentators doubt that the Court’s consent jurisprudence actually comports with a 
satisfying conception of voluntariness or meaningful freedom to decide. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 
519 U.S. 33, 46–48 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that most people do not feel free to walk 
away from police officers); Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for 
Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 774 (2005) (“The idea that [the 
Drayton] defendants acted voluntarily is at once absurd, meaningless, and irrelevant under traditional 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”); Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 211, 216, 221 (2001) (accusing the Supreme Court of ignoring questions of what 
voluntariness means when discussing consent); Daniel R. Williams, Misplaced Angst: Another Look at 
Consent-Search Jurisprudence, 82 IND. L.J. 69, 77 (2007) (calling consent a “myth” of voluntariness). 
26  See, e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986); Owen v. City of 
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652–53 (1980) (discussing the compensatory rationale for damages in 
constitutional torts); cf. David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and 
Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1225–26 (pointing to a compensatory rationale for 
damages). 
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evidence so seized.27 The current Court, however, has settled firmly on the 
notion that money damages, and particularly exclusion, serve as a deterrent 
to future violations.28 
This Part explains that the ex post deterrence model has failed in 
practice for two reasons. The first reason is that Fourth Amendment 
standards are too vague. Put simply, the rules governing police are so 
unclear and malleable that their deterrence effect is minimal. Although in 
some classic economic models uncertain standards actually are thought to 
create greater deterrence, that is not the case when standards are radically 
uncertain.29 This is particularly true when there is little or no sanction to 
back them up. This is the second problem: existing sanctions are 
ineffective. Under the current regime, neither monetary damages nor 
exclusion effectively deters Fourth Amendment violations.30 Exclusion in 
particular fails because of ex post bias. The cases courts typically see are 
ones in which the suspect has been caught red-handed with evidence, and, 
in those situations, courts have a difficult time throwing the evidence out. 
This creates a vicious circle in which violation of the Fourth Amendment 
serves to create further justifications for avoiding its requirements, which 
serves only to make the law even more uncertain, which in turn makes it 
easier to refuse to exclude evidence. 
A. Vague Standards 
It is widely acknowledged that the law governing police conduct is 
extremely unclear.31 The gradual evisceration of the warrant requirement is 
 
27  See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (“[T]here is another consideration—the imperative 
of judicial integrity. The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free.” (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater 
Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 130 (1992) 
(“The exclusionary rule gives the impression that the court system is as clean as clean can be.”). 
28  See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (“Instead we have focused on the efficacy 
of the rule in deterring Fourth Amendment violations in the future.”); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 
531, 539 (1975) (basing the decision to exclude evidence in part on its likely deterrent effect); Richard 
A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 54 (“[D]eterrence is the raison 
d’être of the rule.”). 
29  See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal 
Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 987 (1984) (discussing effects of uncertainty on choices between levels 
of care); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 279, 285–86 (1986) (discussing effect of uncertainty on legal rules). 
30  See infra Part I.B–I.C. 
31  See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Ruling Out the Rule of Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1517 (2007) 
(discussing police discretion and vague standards); see also William C. Heffernan & Richard W. 
Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with 
the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 311, 345 (1991) (discussing the vague standards in the law 
governing police conduct); Rudovsky, supra note 26, at 1223–24 (discussing the combination of vague 
standards and the good faith exception to municipal liability); William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and 
the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1028 & n.50, 1074–77 (1995) (discussing 
vagueness in criminal procedure as it relates to discretion). 
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one cause of Fourth Amendment uncertainty. In theory, the rule is that 
police must obtain warrants before searching,32 but in reality, the exceptions 
to the warrant requirement have eaten up the rule. Of course, a rule with 
exceptions still can provide sufficient certainty to permit deterrence. But 
while commentators agree that the warrant rule is fraught with exceptions, 
they cannot even agree on how many exceptions exist or on what their 
contours are.33 If experts in the field cannot agree on what the law is 
requiring warrants, it is asking a lot of police officers to have a better sense. 
The contours of what constitute the exceptions also are very muddy. For 
example, the Supreme Court’s decisions on what constitutes the scope of a 
lawful search incident to a lawful arrest cycle repeatedly over time.34 
Much of what stands outside the warrant requirement and its 
exceptions also fails to provide guidance to police officers and police 
departments. Increasingly, the Supreme Court relies on tests of general 
“reasonableness.”35 A reasonableness test in theory also could generate 
certain enough results as to achieve deterrence; this has no doubt been the 
case in some areas of tort law.36 In the criminal procedure context, however, 
experience with the reasonableness test inspires less confidence. Take for 
example the recent third-party consent case of Georgia v. Randolph. The 
deciding vote in the case was cast by Justice Breyer, who concluded that 
consent was invalid based on his personal ex post evaluation of four factual 
factors.37 One wonders how any police officer is supposed to apply that 
ruling in the future. Another example is the law governing when roadblocks 
are acceptable. The two leading cases are City of Indianapolis v. Edmond38 
and Illinois v. Lidster.39 It is difficult to reconcile these precedents, and 
 
32  See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971) (“[S]earches conducted outside 
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment . . . .” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967))). 
33  See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 363, 375 & n.39 (enumerating exceptions and arguing that the exceptions have turned the 
Fourth Amendment into “swiss cheese”). Compare Bradley, supra note 1, at 1473–74 (finding over 
twenty exceptions to the warrant requirement), with Bookspan, supra note 9, at 501–02 (counting fifteen 
exceptions). 
34  See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 754–61 (1969) (reviewing the scope of the search 
incident to a lawful arrest exception from Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), onward, and 
returning to a narrower construction). 
35  See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–300 (1999) (looking first to the common law and 
then reasonableness to assess whether governmental action violates the Fourth Amendment). 
36  Cf. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 174 (2d Cir. 1947) (implementing 
reasonableness using a cost–benefit calculus, which is thought to facilitate deterrence). 
37  See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 125–27 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) (finding the 
search unconstitutional because it was targeted at evidence, the party was present and objected, there 
was no apparent danger of evidence destruction, and the officers could have sought a warrant). 
38  531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (requiring a warrant because the checkpoint had a “crime control” 
purpose). 
39  540 U.S. 419, 423 (2004) (excepting a checkpoint with an informational purpose). 
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police cannot be expected to do so on their own without the assistance of 
courts. 
To make matters worse, Fourth Amendment issues are litigated 
relentlessly so that the law is constantly in flux. This is the bane of criminal 
procedure professors, who must adjust their syllabus in significant ways 
each year. Hardly a Supreme Court Term passes without some major 
pronouncement, each of which generates activity in the lower courts. There 
is very little stability. 
There is nothing intrinsic in Fourth Amendment law that requires it to 
be unclear.40 Indeed, courts in a variety of jurisdictions have suggested 
bright-line rules that might clarify matters. But, especially when those rules 
might seem to disadvantage police, the Supreme Court swats them down in 
favor of multi-factored reasonableness tests. Two examples are Ohio v. 
Robinette, rejecting the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding that police officers 
must tell motorists they are free to go before obtaining consent, and Florida 
v. Bostick, rejecting the Florida Supreme Court’s view that asking consent 
of passengers stuck on a bus was invalid.41 The response of the Supreme 
Court in both cases was to adopt totality-of-the-circumstances tests. 
The vagueness of Fourth Amendment law stands as a major obstacle to 
effective deterrence. A simple example helps bring the point home: Assume 
that the Fourth Amendment standard can be located on an interval between 
zero and ten, where zero represents a very lenient constitutional standard 
and ten a very strict one. If the law clearly stated a precise standard of five, 
and punished police officers that failed to meet the standard, then police 
officers would meet it. 
Of course, providing a perfectly clear standard often is unrealistic. The 
effect of uncertainty depends on the extent of uncertainty. While models 
and theory suggest that in some areas moderate uncertainty can result in 
greater deterrence, great uncertainty, which plagues Fourth Amendment 
law, leads to inadequate deterrence. Suppose, initially, that there is 
moderate uncertainty, such that the police view the legal standard as being 
somewhere between four and six. If the sanction for failing to meet the 
standard is substantial, police officers will take excessive care, at the six 
level, to make sure they are not found to be in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
But, as we have seen, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is plagued by 
great, not moderate, uncertainty. Now assume that the police view the legal 
standard as being somewhere between one and nine. Faced with such great 
uncertainty, eliminating any chance of violating the Fourth Amendment 
 
40  The remedy of ex post exclusion, however, does push systematically towards greater uncertainty. 
See infra Part I.B.1 (describing ex post bias). 
41  See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (supplanting the Ohio Supreme Court’s bright-line 
rule with an examination of the totality of the circumstances); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 
(1991) (remanding the case for examination of the totality of the circumstances). 
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would require police to adopt an excessive degree of care at the nine 
level—a level of care that would severely impede the police officer’s ability 
to carry out her job. Especially when faced with weak sanctions, rather than 
adopt this excessive care level, police will choose an inadequate care 
level.42 
To be more precise, assume that the uncertainty surrounding the level-
five standard follows a uniform distribution. Under moderate uncertainty, 
the court is equally likely to set the standard anywhere between four and 
six. If police increase their care level by one unit—say, from four to five—
this reduces the chances of being found to be in violation by 50 percentage 
points, from 100% to 50%. Under high uncertainty, the court is equally 
likely to set the standard anywhere between one and nine. In that 
circumstance, if officers increase the care level by one unit—again from 
four to five—this reduces the chances of being found to be in violation by 
only 12.5 percentage points, from 37.5% to 50%. While a 50 percentage 
point reduction may be large enough to justify the cost of this extra unit of 
care, a 12.5 percentage point reduction might not. 
Of course, even in the face of moderate uncertainty, deterrence will fail 
if there are not effective sanctions to assure it. As the next sections show, 
those sanctions have failed. Indeed, as the final section of this Part notes, 
there is a downward spiral here: sanctions fail because courts do not have 
the stomach for suppressing evidence of crime, but that failure to do so 
creates yet more uncertainty in the law, making deterrence even more of an 
ephemera. 
B. Ineffective Sanctions I: The Exclusionary Rule 
To say that the exclusionary rule is a failure is to risk hyperbole and 
understatement at the same time. As its defenders would point out, there is 
not much available as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations but 
exclusion, and its regular use in courts throughout the country undoubtedly 
provides some assurance of police compliance with basic constitutional 
mandates. That said, its critics deride it volubly and even its defenders 
readily acknowledge its manifold failings. 
1. Ex Post Bias.—In general, ex post remedies are preferable to some 
sort of enforcement ex ante. Ex post remedies eliminate the need for 
judicial review in every case. Only those in which something goes awry 
will require litigation.43 
 
42  See sources cited supra note 29. The line between moderate uncertainty, which leads to 
overdeterrence, and extreme uncertainty, which results in underdeterrence, is not a clear one. So how do 
we know that, in the Fourth Amendment context, the line has been crossed? The answer harkens back to 
the broad recognition that deterrence is not working well in this area. The failure of deterrence, we 
argue, suggests that the degree of uncertainty is extreme and that sanctions are ineffective. 
43  See Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 RAND J. 
ECON. 271, 271–72 (1984) (describing the relative efficiency of ex post remedies as compared to ex ante 
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When it comes to the Fourth Amendment, however, the ex post nature 
of the remedy inserts a profound bias, one that is the chief basis for the 
failure of the exclusionary rule. Simply stated, the problem is this: in light 
of the exclusionary rule, the vast majority of cases to which the judiciary is 
exposed involves people who have been caught red-handed violating the 
law.44 This post hoc bias has done more to undermine the utility of 
exclusion—and indeed the Fourth Amendment generally—than any other 
quality of the exclusionary rule. 
Begin with the obvious: it is asking a lot of judges to regularly let bad 
types go free simply “because the constable has blundered.”45 As 
commentators delight in pointing out, the exclusionary rule rubs our faces 
in the costs of the Fourth Amendment.46 Although some judges demonstrate 
the courage of the law’s convictions, many, many do not—and this cannot 
come as too great a surprise. 
Even if judges, acting on their own, could be expected on a regular 
basis to turn criminals back onto the streets because of the way evidence 
has been obtained, no community is going to stand by quietly and allow this 
to happen. There are famous cases, such as when, during the presidential 
election campaign of 1996, Judge Harold Baer Jr. brought the wrath of 
President Bill Clinton and his opponent Bob Dole down on his head for 
daring to suppress a trunk full of cocaine and heroin.47 But the phenomenon 
is both familiar and expected. 
The ex post nature of exclusion has the deeper effect of skewing the 
law itself. This happens for two reasons. First, for the most part courts only 
consider police conduct in cases in which that conduct paid off.48 If courts 
only see the positive results of a form of policing they are asked to evaluate, 
it is easy to see why judges would give that policing their stamp of 
 
liability); Stuntz, supra note 2, at 886–88 (explaining that ex ante review is rare because of the high cost 
relative to ex post remedies). 
44  See Amar, supra note 1, at 796 (“The criminal defendant . . . is often unrepresentative of the 
larger class of law-abiding citizens, and his interests regularly conflict with theirs.”); Slobogin, supra 
note 33, at 403 (“[U]nder the exclusionary regime, the Fourth Amendment is virtually always associated 
with a criminal; only people who have been found in possession of evidence of a crime seek 
exclusion.”). 
45  People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). 
46  See, e.g., Amar, supra note 1, at 799 (“The exclusionary rule renders the Fourth Amendment 
contemptible in the eyes of judges and citizens. Judges do not like excluding bloody knives, so they 
distort doctrine, claiming the Fourth Amendment was not really violated.”). 
47  See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Alison Mitchell, 
Clinton Defends His Criticism of a New York Judge’s Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, at A12 
(discussing President Clinton and Senator Dole’s criticism of Judge Baer’s decision to suppress 
evidence). 
48  By definition exclusion implies that there is some evidence to exclude. We are not the first 
commentators to note the effect this might have on the law. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 1, at 799; Dallin 
H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 736 (1970) 
(pointing out that exclusion can only benefit the guilty). 
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approval. Second, given the bad types at issue, judges are inexorably 
pushed to put the law’s imprimatur on what the cops have done, even if 
they would have balked ex ante. This means not only admitting illegally 
obtained evidence but also often twisting the law to justify admission.49 
Anyone who reads Fourth Amendment cases is familiar with this 
phenomenon, which serves to leave the doctrine governing police conduct 
highly malleable and uncertain. 
Indeed, there is every reason to believe that Fourth Amendment law at 
present is suboptimal. The chief regulators of police practices at present are 
courts. Yet, those courts base their decisionmaking on a biased sample. 
Police practices are judged only in cases in which they proved successful. If 
judges also regularly saw false positives—illegal searches that uncovered 
no evidence of criminal conduct—they would be quicker to condemn those 
very same police practices. As Part IV makes clear, there is data to support 
the notion that the sample of cases courts view daily is wildly biased. 
2. The Problem of Testilying.—The problems associated with ex post 
exclusion are exacerbated by the documented problem of false police 
testimony. Police understandably hate to see evidence excluded once they 
have caught someone with it. Under Fourth Amendment law, it is not 
uncommon that some shading of the facts might move a search from the 
bad to the good column. So, cops shade. No one is sure how much of it goes 
on, but evidence and anecdote suggest a fair amount.50 The problem is so 
acute it even has a clever name: testilying.51 
No doubt as part of the ex post bias, courts tacitly countenance the 
lying. Exclusion hearings often turn on whether to believe the version of 
events supplied by the defendant or that supplied by the police.52 Given the 
payoff of exclusion, defendants have an incentive to lie. Cops simply see 
 
49  See Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 112 (2003) (“The 
hydraulic effect, as Chief Judge John M. Walker, Jr. has sometimes called it, or the slippery slope, 
means that courts keep expanding what is deemed a reasonable search or seizure.” (footnote omitted)). 
50  Rare are the cases where evidence is available to definitively prove the police are lying. However, 
commentators have uncovered evidence in a variety of forms. See Orfield, supra note 27 (quantifying 
lying by police in the Chicago courts); Melanie D. Wilson, An Exclusionary Rule for Police Lies, 
47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5–12 (2010) (categorizing and summarizing the available evidence). 
51  CITY OF NEW YORK, COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION & THE 
ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, COMMISSION REPORT 36 (1994), available at 
http://www.parc.info/client_files/Special Reports/4 - Mollen Commission - NYPD.pdf (“Several officers 
also told us that the practice of police falsification in connection with such arrests is so common in 
certain precincts that it has spawned its own word: ‘testilying.’”); see also Oaks, supra note 48, at 739–
40 (“[O]fficers will ‘twist’ the facts in order to prevent suppression of evidence and release of persons 
whom they know to be guilty. . . . [T]he policeman is ‘programmed to respond so as to legalize an 
arrest.’”). 
52  See Calabresi, supra note 49, at 113 (“But again, the question of fact as to whether the police are 
lying, or whether the evidence was properly obtained, is often close. If it is a close question and a judge 
finds that the police did not tell the truth, then—given the exclusionary rule—a murderer or rapist will 
be released. As a result, when in doubt a judge will say, ‘Maybe they are telling the truth.’”). 
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what they do as fighting fire with fire, and judges naturally are inclined to 
choose the blue over black and white stripes in a factual dispute. 
3. Indirect v. Direct Sanctions.—Finally, exclusion fails as both a 
direct and indirect sanction—a distinction that will be useful to bear in 
mind. Direct sanctions are those imposed on the person whose behavior we 
wish to alter, the primary actor.53 Indirect sanctions are imposed on 
someone else, in the hope that that person can control the behavior of the 
primary actor.54 A helpful analogy is vicarious liability of employers. The 
idea is that such liability motivates the employer to better control the 
behavior of its employees.55 
Exclusion is primarily an indirect sanction—an ineffective indirect 
sanction. The issue is straightforward: the ostensible purpose of the 
exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, but the mechanism is a lost 
conviction. The evidence and the literature suggest that convictions are low 
on the list of things police are rewarded or punished for.56 Police care about 
arrests, not convictions.57 And they care about crime rates because when 
these go up, the police hear about it.58 Both are likely enhanced by Fourth 
Amendment violations. Violations generate more arrests. And aggressive 
policing is thought by some to lower crime rates.59 
 
53  See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Aimster and Optimal Targeting, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1148, 
1150–51 (2007) (providing background on the difference between direct and indirect sanctions). 
54  See Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal 
Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (1982) (describing indirect and direct sanctioning 
regimes); see also Levinson, supra note 53, at 1151 (describing the conditions necessary for indirect 
liability to be efficient). 
55  See generally Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984) 
(describing the incentives created by indirect sanctions like vicarious liability). See also Jennifer Arlen 
& Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997); Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 144 (Alon Harel & Keith N. Hylton eds., 
2012). 
56  See JONATHAN RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE 45 (1973) (describing how statistics are calculated 
before final disposition, making the arrest more important to internal performance reviews than the 
outcome); JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETY 150 (4th ed. 2011) (explaining the importance of clearance rates in internal performance 
reviews); Milton A. Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49 UMKC L. 
REV. 24, 33 (1980) (noting the importance of arrest records in determining promotions); Slobogin, supra 
note 33, at 378 (noting that arresting officers bear little responsibility for prosecutorial outcomes). 
57  See Calabresi, supra note 49, at 117 (“[E]xcluding evidence fails to affect the ‘cowboy’ cop very 
much. The cowboy has gathered the evidence, arrested the criminals, and received all the publicity: ‘I’ve 
caught the perps. I did my job . . . .’”); infra notes 195–203 and accompanying text. 
58  See Slobogin, supra note 33, at 378. 
59  See generally Jack R. Greene & Ralph B. Taylor, Community-Based Policing and Foot Patrol: 
Issues of Theory and Evaluation, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 195, 197 (Jack R. 
Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1988) (discussing uncertainties in the results of empirical studies 
on community policing); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis Of Criminal 
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1164 (1998) (arguing that community policing deserves some of the 
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One might think that prosecutors, who bear the costs of exclusion, 
would see that police were trained to avoid violations in the first place or 
would insist that some mix of incentives and discipline were put in place to 
assure police compliance. That is how an indirect sanction should work, and 
to some extent, perhaps it does. But police and prosecutors often behave as 
though they work for different entities, rather than being the obvious 
assembly line from street to prison that they are.60 It is easy to see the 
advantages of this behavior—prosecutors in particular can benefit by 
denying knowledge of what police are doing—and courts are altogether too 
willing to buy the story of separation. Moreover, prosecutors may lack a 
sufficient reason to bring pressure. Exclusion is a relatively rare event.61 
Prosecutors do stand to pay a substantial price when evidence is excluded in 
big cases, and there is some indication that in those cases, the rules are 
followed, proving that deterrence need not be a chimera.62 In the vast run of 
police conduct, however, the more violations, the more offenders brought to 
the prosecutor, the more charges to bring against those offenders.63 All of 
this is good in the world of prosecution. 
C. Ineffective Sanctions II: Money Damages 
The exclusionary rule is widely reviled. As the foregoing suggests, 
whether one is for or against more vigorous protection of Fourth 
Amendment rights, it is easy to see why the contempt exists. So, why does 
the exclusionary rule linger on as the primary means of vindicating those 
rights? Because, all claims to the contrary notwithstanding, it most likely is 
the best thing going. 
The failings of the exclusionary rule have led a host of commentators 
to call for money damages as the remedy for Fourth Amendment 
 
credit for declining crime rates during the 1990s); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality 
of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 573–75 
(1997) (summarizing the arguments linking community policing to crime rates); Mary Ann Wycoff, The 
Benefits of Community Policing: Evidence and Conjecture, in COMMUNITY POLICING, supra, at 103, 
107–11 (finding a reduction in fear and improved relations between police and community members). 
60  See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. 
L. REV. 749, 755 (2003) (discussing the separation of police and prosecutors into a “coordinate mode of 
organization” in America (quoting MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE 
AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 44 (1986))). 
61  See Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 
1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585, 596 (describing low success rates for motions to suppress). 
62  See Orfield, supra note 27, at 116–18 (noting that officers tend to follow the rules in important 
“heater” cases because they know the stakes are so high, but that the opposite is true for minor crimes, 
such as possession). 
63  See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 879 & nn.42–43 (2009) (discussing overcharging and the 
plea bargaining process). 
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violations.64 The chief virtue of such a remedy, commentators argue, is that 
it is tailored to the victim and the violation.65 Whereas the exclusionary rule 
appears to reward only the guilty, with money damages those who are 
blameless can recover.66 And careful calibration supposedly will achieve 
just the right level of deterrence.67 
Yet, money damages in theory are very different from money damages 
in practice. In the real world, the monetary remedy imagined by these 
commentators is a fantasy. Nothing like it exists, or is likely to, and even if 
it did, it is unclear it would achieve what is suggested for it. 
1. Direct Damages and Indirect Damages.—Who will pay the 
money damages? This preliminary question will influence the efficacy of 
the damages remedy and thus its potential role in the enforcement of the 
Fourth Amendment. The basic distinction, as before, is between damages as 
a direct sanction and damages as an indirect sanction.68 As a direct sanction, 
damages are imposed on the police officer whose behavior we aim to 
control. As an indirect sanction, damages are imposed at a higher level on 
the police department or on the local government. These damages are not 
felt directly by the police officer and can affect the officer’s behavior only 
if they spur the mayor or police chief to instill an effective disciplinary 
system. 
Many believe that direct damages in policing cases are a myth, and in 
truth, the number of cases in which police officers end up paying damages 
from their own pockets appears to be exceedingly small.69 But this does not 
necessarily imply that direct damages are a myth. It could be that direct 
damages effectively deter the extreme, bad faith violations for which they 
are doctrinally available, and, for this reason, cases in which such damages 
 
64  See, e.g., Amar, supra note 1, at 798 (arguing that money damages are preferable to exclusion); 
Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application of Restitutive 
Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY L.J. 937, 979–80 (1983); Posner, supra note 28, at 55–56 (arguing that 
damages are a more efficient remedy than exclusion). 
65  See Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 
57 WASH. L. REV. 635, 639 (1982) (arguing that damages can be calibrated according to the 
circumstances of the case); Jeffrey Standen, The Exclusionary Rule and Damages: An Economic 
Comparison of Private Remedies for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1443, 1473 
(arguing that damages can be determined based on the type of violation). 
66  This is not actually the case. If the function of the exclusionary rule is deterrence, then the police 
also would be deterred from intruding into the lives of those who do not possess evidence of criminality 
and who are not in fact criminals. Still, the exclusionary rule appears, at first glance, to only benefit 
criminals. 
67  See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
68  See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
69  See John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 
47, 50 & n.16 (1998) (describing personal interviews with police officers who could not recall an 
instance in which an officer was not indemnified); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: 
Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 353 (2000) (noting 
the “near-universal” practice of indemnifying officers). 
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are awarded are so rare. It is unnecessary to resolve this question 
definitively; for the sake of expositional completeness, we explain why 
direct damages, even when or if they are doctrinally available, are likely to 
be ineffective. 
Both direct and indirect damages suffer from serious, albeit different, 
problems, as explained below. But there is a preliminary problem that they 
both share—the assessment problem. 
2. What Are the Damages?.—Any system of optimal deterrence 
requires assessing accurately the monetary value of the damages incurred 
by Fourth Amendment violations. Right off the bat, however, this is going 
to be a challenge. The law successfully monetizes things like property 
damage; it is not as good at monetizing psychic injury. While pain and 
suffering damages and damages for emotional distress are available in 
theory, recovery is subject to strict limitations, and even when these 
limitations are overcome, the amount of damages awarded is unlikely to 
fully compensate for the harm done.70 
In most Fourth Amendment cases psychic injury is a major—if not the 
major—component of harm. Although property damage can occur when 
police engage in searches or seizures without probable cause—perhaps even 
great damage—for the most part, the psychological injury easily outweighs 
the property damage. It is undoubtedly difficult for most people even to 
comprehend the trauma of having police officials burst into one’s home or 
of having one’s liberty taken away by being seized, searched, cuffed, and 
shoved into the back of a police car. Victims describe the utter helplessness, 
the feeling of freedom being taken away, the inability to trust cops 
thereafter.71 Money is entirely incommensurable to these sorts of injuries, 
making them extremely difficult to price. 
Moreover, as explained by Daryl Levinson: 
Recovery is not permitted for the inherent value of constitutional rights, their 
value as public goods, the “expressive harms” inflicted by constitutional 
violations, the moral costs of breaching deontological prohibitions, third-party 
 
70  See Oaks, supra note 48, at 718 (discussing the inability of money damages to account for the 
injury suffered by search victims); Stuntz, supra note 2, at 900–01 (describing the injury in illegal search 
cases as “complicated and almost wholly subjective” and notoriously difficult to value); see also Dillon 
v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 919–21 (Cal. 1968) (imposing strict requirements to limit the scope of potential 
liability for purely emotional harms); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 170 
(1992) (discussing the strict limitations on recovery for emotional harm in tort law). 
71  See, e.g., McCabe v. Mais, 580 F. Supp. 2d 815, 832 (N.D. Iowa 2008) (“I was humiliated, and I 
felt violated. I felt as though I had lost control of my own body. I couldn’t imagine many things that 
would be worse . . . .”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. McCabe v. Parker, 608 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 
2010); Wright v. United States, 963 F. Supp. 7, 18 (D.D.C. 1997) (“In this case, both Michelle and Justo 
Cruz testified that they suffered from recurrent nightmares for several weeks; and Justo Cruz described 
how, for a while, he was constantly nervous and easily startled by loud noises.”). 
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harms . . . or any of the other conceivable harms to society that may occur 
when government violates constitutional rights.72 
The valuation problem prevents money damages from achieving optimal 
deterrence. The problem is fundamental, not limited to the current damages 
regime. As Levinson rightly concludes: “[I]t is virtually impossible to 
imagine an alternative damages measure that could non-arbitrarily convert 
these types of intangible harms into dollars.”73 
3. Legal Barriers. 
a. General.—Assuming one could price such injuries, they also 
have to be recoverable as a matter of law. Scholars often argue that it would 
make more sense to rely on money damages as though they are available. 
But they are not; moving to a regime of money damages rather than 
exclusion would require significant legal reform from the judiciary and the 
legislative branches and perhaps even a constitutional amendment. Unless 
these legal barriers are altered, recovery of damages sufficient to achieve 
the tailored deterrence commentators laud is simply elusive. 
At present, the law governing torts does not allow for or severely 
restricts recovery for many of the very damages that are most important in 
these cases, specifically the psychic injury and the injury from trumping an 
inherently valuable constitutional right, described above.74 The law could be 
amended to impose statutory damages, but this has not happened.75 
Moreover, even if statutory damages were adopted, other legal barriers 
would prevent money damages from effectively deterring illegal searches. 
b. Direct sanctions.—Even if tort law generally allowed for 
recovery, the immunities inherent in litigation over constitutional torts 
utterly defeat recovery in most cases.76 Suing the police proves very 
difficult because individual officials are cloaked with “good faith” 
immunity, and liability attaches only for violations of “clearly established” 
law.77 Yet the law in this area is extremely muddy, providing cover even for 
 
72  Levinson, supra note 69, at 372 (footnotes omitted). 
73  Id. 
74  See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
75  See Steiker, supra note 1, at 848–50 (noting the substantial statutory reforms necessary to make a 
damages scheme workable). Any statutory reform would also need to consider practical problems as 
well. See Stuntz, supra note 2, at 910 (discussing the “insoluble problems” with a damages scheme). 
76  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional 
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1749–53 (1991) (discussing the heightened requirements to defeat 
qualified immunity in Bivens actions after Harlow v. Fitzgerald); see also Theodore Eisenberg & 
Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 679–80 (1987) 
(presenting empirical evidence on the low rate of success for plaintiffs in constitutional tort actions). 
77  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 
(2009); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638–39 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 
(1982). 
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the most egregious seeming of violations. For example, the Supreme Court 
recently unanimously condemned strip-searching adolescent students by 
police and school officials (who in this case were looking for 
nonprescription painkillers) but denied damages because the law on this 
was not clear.78 As John Jeffries has pointed out, even in the absence of 
immunity, recovering direct damages for constitutional torts that require 
proof of unreasonableness is extremely difficult.79 
By most accounts, police officers never, or very rarely, pay any 
damages from their own pockets. To the extent this is true, the prospect of 
direct damages is vanishingly slim and does not contribute to deterrence. 
The primary reason for this is indemnity. Good evidence on actual practice 
regarding indemnity is remarkably difficult to come by, but those involved 
with the issue seem confident that police commonly are indemnified for 
constitutional torts that occur while on the job.80 On the other hand, there 
may well be a class of extreme, bad faith violations for which direct 
damages are a real possibility; there is some evidence in case law 
suggestive of this.81 That such cases, and such direct damages, are rarely 
observed may simply suggest that, in this restricted domain, direct damages 
are an effective deterrent. 
c. Indirect sanctions.—Many people advocate money damages 
actions against governments to enforce the Fourth Amendment,82 but the 
legal obstacles here are even more acute than for suing individual cops. 
Municipalities enjoy no good faith immunity, but they cannot be sued for 
money damages unless one can prove that the conduct engaged in by 
 
78  Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009). 
79  See Jeffries, supra note 69, at 70 (1998) (explaining that vagaries in constitutional doctrine make 
it inherently difficult to prove police action was unreasonable); see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s 
Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 862 (2010) (describing the many potentially 
exculpatory considerations in the reasonableness inquiry). 
80  At a minimum, indemnity is common. Most scholars would consider this to be an understatement. 
See Richard Emery & Ilann Margalit Maazel, Why Civil Rights Lawsuits Do Not Deter Police 
Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a Proposed Solution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 587, 
587–88 (2000) (describing firsthand experience suing New York City police officers, who were always 
indemnified); Jeffries, supra note 69, at 50 (describing interviews with officers who could not recall an 
instance in which officers were not indemnified); Levinson, supra note 69, at 353 (describing indemnity 
as “near-universal”); Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 810 n.158, 811 
(1979) (failing to find a single instance in which a Connecticut officer was not indemnified). 
Nevertheless, the evidence is somewhat sparse and some do disagree. See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING 
GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 86, 229–30 nn.23–28 (1983) (arguing that 
indemnity is far from certain). 
81  Many state and municipal indemnification statutes exempt intentional or willful misconduct. See, 
e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-k (McKinney 2007); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 17(2)(a) (McKinney 2008 
& Supp. 2012); Ruiz v. Herrera, 745 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Karas v. Snell, 142 N.E.2d 46 (Ill. 
1957); Bearden v. City of Boulder City, 507 P.2d 1034 (Nev. 1973). 
82  See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
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officials was municipal “policy.”83 The law on what constitutes a policy is 
byzantine and does not line up at all with common intuition. “Policy” is 
made only when the individual or entity at the top of the hierarchy makes it 
so.84 Yet, much of what police do that is considered impermissible is tacit or 
difficult to trace to the top. A large minority on the Supreme Court has 
argued for years these rules require change, but to no avail.85 
Suing states makes suing municipalities look like child’s play. Under 
the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, as interpreted 
by the Supreme Court, states simply cannot be sued for money damages for 
constitutional violations.86 The exception is if (1) the violation is of one’s 
Fourteenth Amendment rights and (2) Congress has explicitly authorized 
such suit.87 The first criterion is met here, but the Supreme Court has held 
that 42 U.S.C. § 1983—the civil rights provision—does not constitute such 
authorization, and more direct authorization from Congress has not been 
forthcoming, nor is it likely to be.88 
4. Practical Problems. 
a. General.—It is not just the law that poses difficulty; these 
legal barriers compound with some practical problems in suing over police 
violations. Litigation is expensive and time-consuming. Yet, to achieve its 
deterrent effect, litigation over Fourth Amendment violations must occur 
regularly enough to be a plausible threat and to develop the law necessary 
to provide rules for police officials. Especially in light of the legal obstacles 
just discussed, that is unlikely. But practical obstacles turn unlikely into 
ephemeral. 
 
83  See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (requiring the violation to be 
caused by a municipal policy); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 633 (1980) (elaborating on 
Monell’s policy requirement). 
84  See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988) (“Authority to make municipal 
policy may be granted directly by a legislative enactment or may be delegated by an official who 
possesses such authority . . . .” (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986))); 
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483. 
85  See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 132 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that the majority’s test of 
municipal policy is “unduly narrow and unrealistic”); see also McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 
781, 802 (1997) (5–4 decision) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s test is overly rigid 
and difficult to satisfy); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 433–36 (1997) (5–4 decision) 
(Breyer J., dissenting) (arguing that post-Monell decisions on municipal liability should be revisited). 
86  Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) (“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be 
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.”); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (“For over a century we have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over suits against 
unconsenting States ‘was not contemplated . . . .’” (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 15)). 
87  See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that a clear showing of congressional 
purpose is necessary to override sovereign immunity under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
88  Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66–67 (1989); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 
U.S. 651, 675–76 (1974) (“But it has not heretofore been suggested that § 1983 was intended to create a 
waiver of a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . .”). 
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It is not easy to find plaintiffs with the wherewithal to sue. This 
includes the financial means to pursue litigation, but it is much more than 
that. As anyone who has ever had anything to do with litigation knows, it is 
time-consuming and emotionally draining. All the more so when one sues 
the police, for there is undoubtedly a stigma in suing police officials, who 
most citizens assume are doing what is appropriate.89 Perhaps that is why 
these suits are rare today. Some of the most successful have been class 
actions over racial profiling, often with named plaintiffs who themselves 
are people of some prominence.90 
In theory, the monetary challenges of litigation can be met with 
funding mechanisms that make it attractive for lawyers to front the costs, 
but here, theory and reality tend to diverge. There are such funding 
mechanisms, most notably contingent fees and fee-shifting rules like the 
attorney’s fees provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.91 Still, suing police is 
unlikely to be attractive to most attorneys who must make a living handling 
a variety of cases, including those that require the honest testimony of 
police. 
Finally, sympathetic juries also are going to be difficult to come by. 
People tend to believe the police.92 This is unquestionably going to be the 
case if the “guilty” bring suit and it is their word against officers. 
b. “Empty pockets”.—Another practical problem is that of 
empty pockets. For money damages to work as a direct deterrent, the police 
officer must be held liable. If suits are against police officials, even if good 
faith immunity is overcome, the defendant must be able to pay the 
 
89  See Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 
45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 787 (1970) (discussing fear of suing the police); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure 
for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 62 (1994) (discussing 
public preconceptions of police behavior); Posner, supra note 28, at 62 (noting that fear of reprisal may 
deter individuals from bringing tort claims for Fourth Amendment violations). 
90  See, e.g., Md. State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Md. Dep’t of State Police, 72 F. Supp. 2d 
560 (D. Md. 1999) (class action alleging racial profiling in highway stops in which the lead plaintiff was 
the President of the Maryland ACLU); Press Release, ACLU, Landmark Settlement Reached with 
Maryland State Police In “Driving While Black” Case (Apr. 2, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/
racial-justice/landmark-settlement-reached-maryland-state-police-driving-while-black-case. 
91  See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006) (providing for fee shifting in Section 1983 suits); see also 
Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 790 (2011) (reviewing fee-
shifting and contingency mechanisms); Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining 
Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as 
Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 745 (1988) (testing incentives created by contingency and fee-
shifting provisions). 
92  See Maclin, supra note 89, at 62 (pointing out that juries tend to sympathize with the police 
(quoting Donald Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified 
Theory of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 591, 629 (1990))); L. Timothy 
Perrin et al., If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 738 
(1998) (“It is commonly recognized that juries will believe law enforcement officials before relying on a 
plaintiff’s account.”). 
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judgment. When it comes to large monetary awards, however, many police 
officer defendants may well be judgment-proof.93 
c. Ineffectiveness of institutional sanctions to achieve 
deterrence.—The quick answer to the problem of empty 
pockets involves suits against entities rather than officials or 
indemnification of the latter by the former. But this solution, too, has its 
difficulties.94 Even when damages are imposed on police departments or 
cities, these damages are often not very high in relation to their budgets.95 
Recent scholarship suggests police departments typically remain blissfully 
and intentionally unaware of damages paid in litigation over police 
conduct.96 If this is the case, then there is no reason to expect deterrence or 
institutional change that will lead to deterrence. 
Rather, damage awards effectively are paid by taxpayers, who might 
be quite happy to finance the tough-on-crime policy.97 As Daryl Levinson 
has so vividly explained, theorists who favor money damages against 
government entities seem to assume these entities will behave like a firm, 
mechanically internalizing both costs and benefits.98 And, specifically, that 
it will work to instill a system of disciplinary sanctions to deter violations 
that cost the entity money.99 Yet, in the literature there is confusion as to 
whether this is the case, and in reality it probably is not.100 
Although it is difficult to know for sure, it appears that at best, 
governments internalize benefits far better than costs, suggesting that 
government liability will not necessarily diminish the number of Fourth 
Amendment violations. This is because governments can simply decide to 
incur those costs in order to obtain the desired public good: social order.101 
 
93  See S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1986) (discussing the 
skewed incentives created by judgment-proof defendants); see also Rudovsky, supra note 26, at 1229 
(pointing out that officers generally have few assets and that, in egregious cases, states refuse to 
indemnify, making the defendant judgment proof and leaving plaintiffs uncompensated). 
94  See Heffernan and Lovely, supra note 31, at 324–25 (arguing that indirect sanctions tend to 
underdeter the police); Levinson, supra note 53, at 1150–51 (describing the difficulties in making 
indirect sanctions effective). 
95  See Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law 
Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1033 (2010) (pointing out that lawsuits put 
minimal financial pressure on police departments). Often the damages do not come out of the police 
department budget at all, further reducing their deterrent effect. See also Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. 
Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of the Missing Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 781–
82 (2004) (noting that damages are typically paid by the municipality). 
96  See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 95, at 1041–53. 
97  See SCHUCK, supra note 80, at 125. 
98  Levinson, supra note 69, at 357. 
99  Id. at 350. 
100  See id. at 367–72; Schwartz, supra note 95, at 1066–67 (discussing the lack of connection 
between trial outcomes and disciplinary sanctions). 
101  See Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 31, at 363 (describing sanctions as a cost of business for 
police departments); Levinson, supra note 69, at 368. 
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If voters are comfortable with this trade, then taxes will be raised to fund 
the constitutional violations. Such majoritarian control over constitutional 
protections defies the very meaning of those protections. 
Worse yet, the costs and benefits of policing do not fall evenly across 
society, causing very serious distributional effects. Again, predicting these 
precisely can be difficult. Perhaps well-to-do merchants will happily fund 
the cost of violating the rights of urban youth whose street activities 
threaten their economic prosperity. Or, it may be that residents of minority 
communities themselves prefer violating the rights of others in the 
community for sake of social order.102 This, at any rate, is the premise of 
“community policing,” though data suggest that in fact community 
members are less content than they are theorized to be. In any event, New 
York’s stopping and frisking of hundreds of thousands of people, 
disproportionately minorities, with little to show in the way of arrests or 
evidence, exemplifies the problem.103 
D. Ineffective Sanctions III: Other Alternatives 
From time to time, commentators frustrated by both exclusion and 
monetary damages in civil litigation have suggested alternatives. Yet, none 
of these are very practicable either. 
Police departments typically have internal affairs bureaus that deal 
with police misconduct. But these sorts of investigations often are reserved 
for the most serious of violations: allegations of excessive force or 
corruption.104 There is no evidence in the literature that internal affairs 
 
102  See Levinson, supra note 69, at 367–72; Maclin, supra note 89, at 31 (describing a public 
opinion poll that says, “62 percent of those questioned said they would be willing to give up ‘a few of 
the freedoms we have in this country’ to significantly reduce illegal drug use” (quoting Richard Morin, 
Many in Poll Say Bush Plan Is Not Stringent Enough: Mandatory Drug Tests, Searches Backed, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 8, 1989, at A1)); Steiker, supra note 1, at 850 (arguing that “average” citizens are most 
affected by crime and therefore most likely to approve of police “overreaching”). 
103  See CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF NEW YORK, THE NEW YORK CITY 
POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP & FRISK” PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW 
YORK 111 (1999) [hereinafter NYPD STOP & FRISK REPORT] (summarizing the stop and frisk practices 
in New York City and showing that only one out of every nine stops led to an arrest). 
104  See Paul Crotty, Speech, The Corporation Counsel’s View of Independent Oversight of the 
Police Department, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 23, 31 (1995) (describing the hundreds of internal affairs 
bureau agents focused on corruption); Annette Gordon-Reed, Watching the Protectors: Independent 
Oversight of Municipal Law Enforcement Agencies, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 87, 88–90 (1995) 
(describing New York City’s focus on corruption within the police department); Samuel Walker, The 
New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in 
Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 30–35 (2003) (describing modern early-intervention systems 
that focus on use-of-force reporting and implementation of use-of-force policies); see also Barbara E. 
Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 504–05 (2004) 
(discussing the systemic flaws that make most internal affairs bureaus ineffective). 
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departments are searching for or addressing systemic violations of Fourth 
Amendment rights.105 
Similarly ineffective are “remedies” that involve external policing of 
the police. Citizen review boards have had their moment in the sun, but 
studies question their efficacy.106 In any event, they too tend to work in 
cases of police brutality and play almost no role in Fourth Amendment 
violations with less evident physical effects.107 
A favorite in scholarly theory is administrative damages, yet the fact 
that this remedy remains largely theoretical is telling.108 It would be possible 
to construct an administrative system that awards damages for police 
official violations. Not only has no municipality or state jumped to do so, 
but even if there were such remedies, they still would suffer from some of 
the problems identified with civil litigation, the most serious being the way 
governments internalize the costs of damages paid for policing.109 
E. The Downward Spiral 
There is empirical evidence to suggest that despite its warts, many, 
including police officials, believe the exclusionary rule is by far the 
preferable vehicle for enforcing Fourth Amendment rights.110 They praise 
 
105  See Schwartz, supra note 95, at 1066 (presenting data showing that almost 90% of sheriffs’ 
departments do not proactively gather information on lawsuits or engage in meaningful analysis). 
106  For a history of civilian review boards, see SAMUEL WALKER, CITIZEN REVIEW RESOURCE 
MANUAL (1995). For a criticism of review boards, see N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUND., CIVILIAN 
REVIEW OF POLICING: A CASE STUDY REPORT 9–13 (1993) (observing that a range of impediments have 
weakened civilian-oversight agencies); see also SKOLNICK, supra note 56, at 227; Stephen Clarke, 
Arrested Oversight: A Comparative Analysis and Case Study of How Civilian Oversight of the Police 
Should Function and How It Fails, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 2–3 (2009). 
107  See David Brereton, Evaluating the Performance of External Oversight Bodies, in CIVILIAN 
OVERSIGHT OF POLICING: GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 105, 111–12 (Andrew J. 
Goldsmith & Colleen Lewis eds., 2000) (discussing results that show civilian review boards do not 
perform better than their internal counterparts); see also Liqun Cao & Bu Huang, Determinants of 
Citizen Complaints Against Police Abuse of Power, 28 J. CRIM. JUST. 203, 210 (2000) (pointing to 
implementation problems with civilian review boards); cf. Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic 
Stops: An Expanded Role for Civilian Review Boards, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 551, 594 (1997) 
(discussing the history of civilian review and its focus on violence). 
108  See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Daniel P. Weick, Opting for a Legislative Alternative to the 
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 78 UMKC L. REV. 949, 951–53 (2010); Perrin et al., supra note 
92. But see Laurie L. Levenson, Administrative Replacements: How Much Can They Do?, 26 PEPP. L. 
REV. 879, 880–885 (1999) (describing the practical obstacles to any administrative remedy). 
109  See supra notes 94–103 and accompanying text. 
110  See Orfield, supra note 27, at 125–26 (discussing survey responses from police officers 
supporting the rule); Perrin et al., supra note 92, at 732 (noting survey data that shows police officers 
favor exclusion by comparison to other remedies); see also Kamisar, supra note 1, at 137–38 
(summarizing studies that show police prefer exclusion to other remedies). 
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the rule’s educative effect and believe it sends a message.111 Nonetheless, as 
we have seen, the exclusionary rule’s warts are large and ungainly. 
The biggest wart on the exclusionary rule drives ineffective sanctions 
and uncertain law into a vicious downward spiral. While the law could be 
made clearer, there is hydraulic pressure against this given the biased 
sample of cases that courts see.112 Cases come to court. The cops have 
evidence in hand that the defendant is guilty. The court strains to approve 
what the cops have done. Exceptions are created to rules. If the rules were 
clear in the first instance (and sometimes they actually were!), exceptions 
muddy them. Later cases come to court, now with muddier rules and 
equally guilty bad guys. Exceptions to exceptions, and soon neither courts 
nor cops have any clear idea of what cops were not supposed to be doing. 
The result is that the rules cops play by become murkier and murkier, 
making it easier and easier to approve of what cops have done, making the 
rules murkier and murkier. None of this is calculated to improve deterrence. 
II. THE WARRANT MODEL 
If police officers cannot be deterred effectively from making bad 
decisions about the reasonableness of a search or seizure, then we may want 
to consider taking the decision out of the police officer’s hands. Section A 
explains that this is what occurs in other areas of the law when deterrence 
fails. We should replace the police officer’s discretion with the magistrate’s, 
requiring that police seek a warrant before they search or seize. Although 
requiring warrants is hardly novel, much of section B is an entirely unique 
justification rooted in literature from the social sciences for the oft-stated 
but seldom-enforced warrant requirement. As section B points out, 
traditional insistence on a “neutral and detached” magistrate makes sense 
from the perspective of incentives. But section B also relies on literature 
from the social sciences to establish that firmer insistence on a warrant 
requirement would improve the quality of police decisionmaking whether 
or not magistrates are diligent. Finally, section C demonstrates how the 
warrant model solves the vague standards and ineffective remedies 
problems that undermine the current deterrence model. The standard 
defining when a warrant is required will be clearer than existing law 
governing police conduct, and this clarity will enhance the efficacy of the 
remedies used to enforce the warrant requirement. 
 
111  See Loewenthal, supra note 56, at 30–40; Orfield, supra note 27, at 80–82 (discussing 
educational impact of exclusion on the police). 
112  See Calabresi, supra note 49, at 113 (explaining that judges feel pressure to justify admitting 
damning evidence, leading to precedents that gradually complicate the law). 
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A. When Deterrence Fails 
What does the law do when deterrence fails? Looking beyond the 
Fourth Amendment, we find several cases where the law has searched for 
and found alternatives to failed deterrence. These alternatives require asking 
permission before the action is taken. 
Consider licensing requirements. You cannot drive a car without first 
obtaining a driver’s license. You cannot practice medicine without first 
obtaining a medical license. Drivers and doctors must ask for permission 
before engaging in their respective activities. Why? Because deterrence 
alone has proved insufficient in these cases. First, there is a concern about 
ineffective sanctions. An unqualified driver or doctor might cause 
substantial harm, including serious bodily injury or death. Many drivers and 
doctors will not have the financial resources to pay for the harm that they 
cause. The inability to pay sufficiently high damages reduces the deterrent 
effect.113 Vague standards also play a role. What constitutes medical 
malpractice or unsafe driving? While certain undesirable behaviors are 
prohibited by clear rules—think of speeding or running a red light—the 
boundaries of reasonable driving and reasonable medical treatment are 
vague. When ineffective sanctions and vague standards limit deterrence’s 
reach, the law supplements it by requiring ex ante permission, such as 
licensing. 
Other related examples include building permits and zoning variances 
and preclearance of new drugs by the FDA. In fact, these examples more 
closely resemble the warrant requirement because they require advance 
clearance for particular incidents of conduct rather than for broad activities 
like driving or practicing medicine.114 Again, concern about vague standards 
and, especially, ineffective sanctions may justify the resort to preclearance 
in these cases. An unsafe drug can have disastrous side effects. As 
explained above, monetizing bodily harm or even loss of life is difficult, 
and thus legal remedies often undercompensate. Moreover, with potentially 
huge magnitudes of harm, the possibility that wrongdoers will be judgment 
proof provides cause for concern. Drug makers might not be able to pay the 
amount of damages required for effective deterrence.115 Poorly constructed 
buildings similarly can cause large magnitudes of harm—harm that is 
difficult to quantify and, when quantified, difficult for some developers to 
 
113  See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 
(1984) (discussing the judgment-proof problem). Both drivers and doctors must obtain insurance, but 
insurance, while guaranteeing compensation for victims, cannot fully solve the deterrence problem. See 
generally STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987). 
114  See Stuntz, supra note 2, at 886–87. 
115  Some pharmaceutical companies have used the bankruptcy code as a shield against massive 
class actions. For instance, Dow Corning entered Chapter 11 in the face of billions of dollars in potential 
liability. See Barnaby J. Feder, Dow Corning in Bankruptcy over Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1995, 
at A1. 
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pay. Even if the construction project only jeopardizes the character and 
aesthetics of a neighborhood, available sanctions can be ineffective: 
damages might be ineffective because such harm is difficult to quantify, and 
courts would be reluctant to go beyond damages and to order demolition.116 
Finally, the choice between deterrence and permission resembles the 
choice between ex post litigation and ex ante regulation. In the ex post 
litigation model, the threat of being sued deters unreasonable behavior, 
forcing the actor to make the socially desirable decision.117 For example, a 
potential injurer weighs the benefit of action against the associated costs in 
terms of expected liability for harm caused by the action. The decision 
whether to act and how much to invest in precaution is left to the potential 
injurer. The ex ante regulation model places less trust in the actor. Many 
decisions are thus made by the regulator: what type of action is allowed and 
when, what precautions must be implemented, etc.118 Again, the actor’s 
discretion is restricted because the law is unable to effectively influence the 
actor’s decisions through deterrence. 
B. The Benefits of Warrants 
In the Fourth Amendment context as well, preclearance via warrants 
can succeed where ex post, remedy-based deterrence has failed. First, 
advance permission will work because magistrates are likely to make better 
decisions than police officers. This argument is fairly traditional and, as a 
matter of incentives, obviously correct. Second, we make the novel 
argument, grounded in the social science literature, that a serious warrant 
requirement will work by inducing police officers themselves to make 
better decisions. 
1. From Police to Magistrates.—The basic version of the advance 
permission model assumes that the official granting permission will make a 
better decision than the individual seeking it. In the Fourth Amendment 
context, the assumption is that magistrates will make better decisions than 
police officers. As Justice Jackson explained in Johnson v. United States: 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous 
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual 
inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists 
in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached 
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.119 
 
116  See Stuntz, supra note 2, at 901–02 (discussing challenges to accurately calculating damages). 
117  See id. at 887–88. 
118  See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 93 (2004) (discussing 
the role of “direct regulation”). 
119  333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948). 
106:1609 (2012) Taking Warrants Seriously 
 1639
Justice Jackson’s intuition regarding the benefits of magistrates seems 
correct. Magistrates can be expected to make better decisions because they 
face a different incentive structure. Police incentives are skewed toward 
catching criminals and less geared towards protecting the constitutional 
rights of suspects.120 Magistrates are not subject to such biased incentives. 
Magistrates are motivated by the threat of reversal by an appellate court.121 
Appellate review of the magistrate’s warrant-granting or warrant-denying 
decision helps align a magistrate’s incentives with the social optimum. 
There is a pervasive concern in the literature and in court decisions 
with the “rubber stamp” magistrate.122 This concern takes two forms. The 
first is about biased magistrates—magistrates that are not “neutral and 
detached,” but exhibit a pro-police bias. Court decisions focus on this 
concern.123 The second is about laziness rather than bias. It is about the 
magistrate who exercises no scrutiny, or very limited scrutiny, of the 
warrant application.124 The first concern eliminates the benefit of moving 
the locus of discretion from the police officer to the magistrate, while the 
second undermines the very idea of advance permission. 
Although magistrates undoubtedly can be biased, lazy, or both, the 
concern about “rubber stamp” magistrates may be overstated. To begin, one 
hopes that rare is the magistrate who exercises no scrutiny and who signs 
absolutely anything. This is important for the discussion that follows. And 
 
120  See Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110, 1140 & 
n.120 (1981) (arguing that police officers’ incentives are skewed toward engaging in illegal activity). 
121  See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 11 (1995) (noting that exclusion is not directed at magistrates 
because they are not “inclined” to ignore the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 
917 (1984) (discussing differences between motivations of magistrates and police officers). Of course, 
this can be complicated by how magistrates are appointed. Some, for example, may be judges who stand 
for election. If so, how they respond to warrant requests may depend, for example, on whether they feel 
more beholden to the defense bar or prosecutors. This is part of the reason we insist on random 
assignment. 
122  Since Leon, there has been a plethora of scholarship focused on rubber stamp magistrates. See, 
e.g., RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, 
PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 94–102 (1985); Abraham S. Goldstein, The Search Warrant, the Magistrate, 
and Judicial Review, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1199–1201 (1987). 
123  The first time the term “rubber stamp” actually appears in the Court’s opinions in reference to 
magistrates is in Aguilar v. Texas, in which it immediately follows the quote from Johnson. 378 U.S. 
108, 111 (1964). The concept comes up again in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York in the context of a town 
justice who took part in the search, essentially becoming “an adjunct law enforcement officer.” 442 U.S. 
319, 326–27 (1979). Finally, Leon uses the term in a similar fashion to describe a magistrate who does 
not scrutinize the evidence but rather acts as if he were a police officer. See 468 U.S. at 914–15. 
124  Commentators note both concerns. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 122, at 1199–1200 (using the 
term “rubber-stamp magistrates” to refer not only to magistrates who are not neutral but also to 
magistrates who fail to scrutinize affidavits and who merely accept their conclusions); Silas J. 
Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 
19, 34 & n.63 (1988) (using the term “rubber stamp” to refer not only to magistrates who are not 
“neutral and detached” but also to magistrates who subject the warrant application to only “perfunctory 
review”). 
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even if this were the case, appellate review provides some control.125 In 
practice, magistrate quality likely is continuously distributed rather than 
binary. Poor quality magistrates exercise limited scrutiny but still would 
deny completely baseless or illegal warrant applications. 
Moreover, evidence of high, even very high, approval rates of warrant 
applications tells us very little about the quality of magistrates’ 
decisionmaking. Such evidence frequently is offered in support of the 
notion of a rubber stamp or insufficiently attentive magistrate.126 True, high 
approval rates will be observed when the magistrate exercises no 
meaningful scrutiny of warrant applications. But high approval rates may 
also be observed when magistrates carefully scrutinize warrant applications. 
The reason for this is that police officers, cognizant of the fact that their 
warrant applications will be scrutinized carefully, will not bother filing 
weak applications.127 Thus, one might observe the same warrant approval 
rate from the toughest and least tough of magistrates. Which brings us to 
our most important point: the effects of warrants on police decisionmaking. 
Before moving there, however, one point must be emphasized. In 
jurisdictions in which there is more than one magistrate, there is no excuse 
for having a system of warrant authorization that is anything other than 
random. The literature discusses police seeking out favorable magistrates.128 
When it comes to judge-shopping as opposed to forum-shopping, however, 
courts are quite critical. Lawyers have been disbarred and criminal 
convictions overturned because of judge-shopping.129 The reasons for this 
 
125  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983) (“In order to ensure that such an abdication of the 
magistrate’s duty does not occur, courts must continue to conscientiously review the sufficiency of 
affidavits on which warrants are issued.”). 
126  See, e.g., VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 122; Paul Sutton, The Fourth Amendment in Action: 
An Empirical View of the Search Warrant Process, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 405, 421 (1986). This sort of 
criticism is frequently leveled at the special court that issues warrants under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA). See Note, Shifting the FISA Paradigm: Protecting Civil Liberties by 
Eliminating Ex Ante Judicial Approval, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2200, 2205–06 (2008) (citing evidence that 
the FISA court rejected just five applications through 2006). But that court only receives applications 
from a special office within the Department of Justice, and the available evidence suggests that the 
office is extremely careful in what it brings to the court in the first place. See STEWART A. BAKER, 
SKATING ON STILTS: WHY WE AREN’T STOPPING TOMORROW’S TERRORISM 45–47 (2010). 
127  Political scientists call this effect “anticipated reaction” or “rational anticipation.” See William 
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 29 (1994) 
(discussing strategic interactions between coordinate branches of government); see also TERRI JENNINGS 
PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 145 (1999) (discussing the Court’s consideration of 
anticipated reactions in its decisionmaking). 
128  Some commentators have attempted to document this phenomenon, but the data is limited. See, 
e.g., VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 122, at 102; Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, 
Searching for Narcotics in San Diego: Preliminary Findings from the San Diego Search Warrant 
Project, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 221 (2000) (describing results of a study of warrant applications in San 
Diego). 
129  See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice, 50 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 267, 299 (1996) (“Courts consistently treat judge-shopping as an impermissible form of 
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are easy to understand: allowing such conduct is inimical to the rule of law. 
It is difficult to imagine, therefore, why police should get to pick their 
magistrate when seeking a warrant. (Indeed, if officers are allowed to shop 
for magistrates, it might be possible to ferret out true rubber stamps on the 
basis of the number of warrant applications a magistrate receives.)130 
2. Improved Police Decisionmaking.—The warrants-as-deterrents 
model can work by replacing the police officer’s discretion with the 
magistrate’s discretion, as explained above. But requiring advance 
permission can also work by inducing better decisionmaking by the police 
officer. That is the central insight of this section. This happens in two ways. 
First, and most obviously, a police officer anticipating scrutiny by a 
magistrate typically will not bother to request warrants that are not going to 
be granted. Recognizing that she needs the magistrate’s approval, the police 
officer will try to predict and mimic the magistrate’s decisionmaking 
process, requesting only warrants that the magistrate would grant. In other 
words, the police officer will be forced to internalize the magistrate’s 
neutrality and better-aligned incentives.131 This will work all the better to 
the extent magistrate-shopping is eliminated and magistrate selection is 
randomized. 
Second, asking permission forces the police officer to stop and think in 
order to articulate reasons for the search that could convince the magistrate. 
(In most cases, there will not be any actual convincing. The officer will 
realize that a search or seizure is difficult to justify and will avoid bringing 
the case to the magistrate in the first place.) As Lon Fuller noted over fifty 
years ago, “[W]hen men are compelled to explain and justify their 
decisions, the effect will generally be to pull those decisions toward 
 
shopping for justice.”). Sanctions for lawyers found to be judge-shopping vary. See, e.g., Lane v. City of 
Emeryville, No. 93-16646, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 11629 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 1995) (attorney sanctioned 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 for scheme involving dismissing and refiling complaints to procure a more 
favorable judge); Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1384, 1393 (C.D. Cal. 1994) 
(attorney suspended, fined, and ordered to perform twenty-five hours of pro bono work for filing five 
identical complaints in hopes of choosing a favorable judge), rev’d, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995). The 
random assignment process used in most federal courts serves, in part, to prevent this sort of judge-
shopping. See United States v. Mavroules, 798 F. Supp. 61, 61 (D. Mass. 1992) (“This case was 
assigned to me through the blind, random draw selection process utilized in all cases by this court. That 
procedure . . . prevents judge shopping by any party, thereby enhancing public confidence in the 
assignment process.”). 
130  In some cases, police officers may apply for a warrant even when they expect the application to 
be denied to shift blame to the magistrate if the suspect commits a crime that could have been avoided 
by the search or seizure. We abstract from this possibility. 
131  Cf. Philip E. Tetlock, Linda Skitka & Richard Boettger, Social and Cognitive Strategies for 
Coping with Accountability: Conformity, Complexity, and Bolstering, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 632, 638 (1989) (finding that decisionmakers conform to the ideological orientation of those 
to whom they are accountable). 
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goodness . . . .”132 Sometimes we are inclined to act impetuously, believing 
that what we are about to do makes great sense. But on reflection, 
impetuous ideas often appear ill-advised. Nothing can make this as clear as 
having to explain to a third party why we are going to act as we will. In 
essence, compelled consideration and the anticipation of giving reasons can 
lead to self-censorship. It causes the police officer to act in accord with 
considered preferences, rather than impetuous ones. Thus, even without 
regard to the magistrate’s preferences, the requirement of asking permission 
can still lead to better outcomes. 
Research in the social sciences confirms the benefits of articulating 
reasons. The following subsections review that literature. We then address 
the question of whether the process of seeking a magistrate’s approval 
actually is likely to induce police officers to reach better decisions, either by 
forcing them to articulate reasons or by leading them to consider what the 
magistrate will do. Finally, we explain why the current deterrence model, in 
which police officers are also subject to scrutiny, albeit ex post scrutiny by 
judges rather than ex ante scrutiny by magistrates, does not have a similarly 
positive effect on police decisionmaking. 
a. The benefits of articulating reasons: debiasing.—Police 
decisionmaking in the Fourth Amendment context is by nature typically 
biased. Police officers focus on the potential crime-fighting benefits of the 
search or seizure and naturally are less attentive to the costs imposed on the 
individuals who are subjected to the search or seizure.133 Can this bias be 
overcome? Social science research suggests that it can. 
Research in cognitive psychology has identified numerous biases that 
distort decisionmaking.134 After identifying these biases, a natural question 
has been whether and how the biases can be neutralized or minimized. The 
answer is that forcing decisionmakers to consider arguments that run 
counter to their initial, biased beliefs may help reduce the bias and produce 
better decisions. For example, Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, and 
Samuel Issacharoff have shown that forcing litigants to articulate arguments 
in favor of the opposing party reduces self-serving bias and increases the 
likelihood of pretrial settlement.135 
 
132  Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
630, 636 (1958). 
133  See Cass, supra note 120, at 1140; Barry Loveday, Managing Crime: Police Use of Crime Data 
as an Indicator of Effectiveness, 28 INT’L J. SOC. L. 215, 216 (2000). 
134  See generally, e.g., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel 
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) (discussing various forms of cognitive bias, 
including insensitivity to sample size and predictability). 
135  See Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Creating Convergence: 
Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 913 (1997). Considering counterarguments has 
been shown to reduce the hindsight bias and the overconfidence bias. See Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, 
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 134, at 422, 427–31 (discussing hindsight bias); Asher 
Koriat, Sarah Lichtenstein & Baruch Fischhoff, Reasons for Confidence, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: 
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A related literature on the effects of accountability bolsters these 
findings. The accountability studies show that when a decisionmaker is 
accountable for her decisions, namely when she must explain and justify 
her decisions to a third party, the decision tends to be more rational and less 
biased.136 Work on deliberation, while less on point and less certain, 
provides similar insight.137 
The debiasing and accountability literatures suggest that police 
decisionmaking can be improved if accountable police officers are forced to 
consider counterarguments and to think about the harm caused by their 
actions. The warrant requirement effects such debiasing. A police officer 
who expects to have a search request scrutinized by a magistrate will likely 
think through the magistrate’s potential objections when deciding whether 
to request a warrant. 
 
HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 107, 113–14 (1980) (discussing overconfidence bias). This is not to say 
that considering counterarguments always reduces all forms of bias. See, e.g., Neil D. Weinstein & 
William M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to Debiasing Interventions, in HEURISTICS 
AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 313, 313–23 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, 
& Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002) (asking subjects to consider risk factors related to negative outcomes 
and suggesting reasons that negative outcomes that might occur do not reduce the optimism bias). 
136  See Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and Social Cognition, in 
1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 1, 1–10 (1994) (explaining that accountability reduces 
overconfidence and the fundamental attribution bias); Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and the 
Perseverance of First Impressions, 46 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 285, 290–91 (1983) (finding that accountable 
decisionmakers were less vulnerable to belief perseverance—the primacy effect—and were more willing 
to consider new evidence that challenged their initial beliefs). But see Tetlock et al., supra note 131, at 
638 (finding that decisionmakers who are committed to a certain position focus on justifying their prior 
position). 
137  The deliberation literature argues that deliberation reduces bias and irrationality, thus leading to 
better outcomes. Because deliberation requires individuals to convince each other, it filters out bias, 
prejudice, and irrational motivations. See Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in 
DEMOCRACY 87, 95 (David Estlund ed., 2002); id. at 91, 94 (arguing that, when deliberation requires 
justifying a decision to others who have different perspectives, it is likely to require appeals to the 
common good, leading to a preference for the socially desirable outcome); see also Thomas Christiano, 
The Significance of Public Deliberation, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND 
POLITICS 243, 247 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997) (arguing that the process of discussion 
and debate can be expected to “root out policies based on unsubstantiated prejudices,” resulting in better 
decisions); James N. Druckman, Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the 
(Ir)relevance of Framing Effects 11, 20 (July 2, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
www.polmeth.wustl.edu/media/Paper/druck03.pdf (positing and empirically confirming that deliberation 
helps individuals overcome framing effects). In other words, deliberation promotes rationality because 
only reasonable arguments will be effective in deliberation. See Dennis F. Thompson, Deliberative 
Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 497, 504 (2008) (“In 
mutual justification, deliberators present their arguments in terms that are accessible to the relevant 
audience, and respond to reasonable arguments presented by opponents.”). In a sense, the warrant 
requirement mimics forced deliberation. The deliberation might actually occur, as in cases in which the 
magistrate can question the officer. See infra Part III. Or the deliberation may take place only in the 
officer’s head, anticipating the magistrate’s reaction. 
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b. The benefits of articulating reasons: deliberative  
thinking.—Another strand in the psychology literature, which 
dovetails with that above, distinguishes between two modes of 
decisionmaking: affective and deliberative.138 The affective system is driven 
by emotion and prone to bias. When the deliberative system is engaged, a 
person is more likely to make better rational decisions.139 In the Fourth 
Amendment context, the concern is that the police officers’ search and 
seizure decisions are excessively affective and insufficiently deliberative, 
compromising the quality of these decisions. To the extent that forced 
articulation of reasons triggers the deliberative system, the warrant 
requirement will improve police decisionmaking. 
Accountability theory provides reason to believe that the warrant 
requirement will indeed trigger the deliberative system. Accountability 
theory posits that when a decisionmaker is accountable for her decisions, 
namely when the decisionmaker must explain and justify her decisions to a 
third party, she will try harder to make the right decision.140 Accountability 
works to improve decisionmaking by motivating the decisionmaker to 
devote more cognitive resources to decisions for which she will be held 
accountable.141 Moreover, accountability has been found to induce 
“judgments that are more nuanced, less extreme, and less susceptible to 
incidental emotion.”142 
The basic insight from the social science literature is rather 
straightforward. It was nicely captured by Fredrick Schauer, working 
outside these literatures: “[I]t might be supposed that particular decisions 
are often, empirically, the result of decisionmaker partiality, and that an 
artificial constraint of giving reasons, and therefore of generality, is 
designed to counteract this tendency.”143 Schauer adds: 
 
138  See George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Animal Spirits: Affective and Deliberative 
Processes in Economic Behavior (Cornell Univ. Ctr. for Analytic Econ., Working Paper No. 04-14, 
2004), available at http://www.arts.cornell.edu/econ/CAE/04-14.pdf. Some papers propose a similar 
model using different terminology: “hot” for affective states and “cold” or “cool” for deliberative states. 
See, e.g., Janet Metcalfe & Walter Mischel, A Hot/Cool-System Analysis of Delay of Gratification: 
Dynamics of Willpower, 106 PSYCHOL. REV. 3 (1999); B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, 
Addiction and Cue-Conditioned Cognitive Processes 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 9329, 2002), available at http://www.najecon.org/naj/cache/666156000000000052.pdf. 
139  See Christiano, supra note 137, at 247. 
140  Importantly, the emphasis is on explaining and justifying, not on any explicit or implicit awards 
or sanctions for better or worse decisions. 
141  See Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 136, at 3–4; see also Neal P. Mero & Stephan J. Motowidlo, 
Effects of Rater Accountability on the Accuracy and the Favorability of Performance Ratings, 80 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 517, 523 (1995) (finding that subjects who were asked to rate the work of others 
produced more accurate ratings when held accountable). 
142  Jennifer S. Lerner, Julie H. Goldberg & Philip E. Tetlock, Sober Second Thought: The Effects of 
Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 563, 564 (1998). 
143  Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 653 (1995). 
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[W]hen institutional designers have grounds for believing that decisions will 
systematically be the product of bias, self-interest, insufficient reflection, or 
simply excess haste, requiring decisionmakers to give reasons may counteract 
some of these tendencies. Under some circumstances, the very time required to 
give reasons may reduce excess haste and thus produce better decisions. A 
reason-giving mandate will also drive out illegitimate reasons when they are 
the only plausible explanation for particular outcomes.144 
The warrant requirement is, in large part, a requirement to give reasons 
in the warrant application. This requirement may be equally important, 
perhaps more important, than the actual review by the magistrate. We 
review some evidence in Part IV suggesting this is the case. Moreover, by 
inducing meaningful reason-giving by the police, the warrant requirement 
improves the magistrate’s decisionmaking process. 
c. Will warrants really improve police decision- 
making?.—Social science theory and empirical results confirm 
the value of compelled reflection and consideration. The permission model 
accomplishes this task. Still, the extent to which the permission model will 
succeed is a function of three variables: (1) the magistrate from whom 
permission must be sought, (2) the police officer’s objective function, and 
(3) the police officer’s innate abilities and personality. 
Addressing the first of these, skeptics might return to the argument 
about the rubber stamp magistrate, claiming that if an officer knows he need 
only obtain a warrant from “Magistrate Easy,” who will sign anything, then 
asking permission will have no effect. The officer will simply align his 
application with Easy’s undemanding preferences. As we have seen, 
however, most magistrates are not rubber stamps in the strong, zero-
scrutiny sense.145 Police officers generally face the possibility of a 
magistrate who will not blindly endorse any warrant application. 
Uncertainty plays an important role in keeping the police honest. For 
any specific magistrate, the officer may be uncertain about the magistrate’s 
threshold for granting warrants, although of course over time the officer 
will gain a better sense of this threshold. More important, in jurisdictions 
with multiple magistrates—some stricter and some less so—the police 
officer should not know in advance which magistrate will receive her 
warrant application. Ergo, our unequivocal call for randomization. From the 
police officer’s perspective, these two types of uncertainty have the same 
 
144  Id. at 657–58 (footnotes omitted); see also Lisa Bortolotti, The Epistemic Benefits of Reason 
Giving, 19 THEORY & PSYCHOL. 624, 638 (2009) (“[I]t is instrumental to creating connections between 
those attitudes and other attitudes subjects have, either allowing subjects to develop a coherent narrative 
or highlighting a clash that can give rise to the revision of their new or prior attitudes.”). 
145  See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1646 
effect—they create uncertainty about the warrant threshold and thus provide 
incentive to refrain from submitting weak warrant applications.146 
Moreover, even in the unlikely event the officer knows in advance he 
is always seeking approval from Magistrate Easy, there are still reasons to 
believe a serious warrant requirement will cause greater reflection. Generic 
reasons offered in support of the warrant, such as “suspect may be in 
possession of narcotics,” are insufficient as a matter of doctrine.147 The 
warrant application must include facts that are specific to the case at 
hand.148 Finally, ex post review of warrant-granting decisions will induce 
meaningful articulation of reasons in the warrant application. Ex post 
review supports the integrity of the warrant application (1) by deterring 
rubber stamp magistrates and (2) by deterring police perjury in the warrant 
application (as elaborated below). 
The police officers’ own characteristics also will bear upon the success 
of the warrant model. Some officers will be impetuous by nature, others 
more careful and thoughtful.149 The warrant requirement will have more of 
an impact on the former than the latter because the thoughtful officer will 
be more deliberative by nature. Similarly, some officers will operate with 
single-minded zeal to enforce the law; others will be inclined to balance 
such zeal with respect for constitutional requirements. Obviously, a warrant 
requirement involving reason-giving will have more of an impact on the 
former than the latter. But even for the impetuous officer, reason-giving is 
likely to reduce the number of searches. 
 
146  For example, assume that the strength of a warrant application lies between zero and ten, and 
assume that the applicable threshold lies somewhere between two and eight. In other words, the police 
officer faces a distribution of thresholds between two and eight but does not know which one will be 
applied to her warrant application. What will the police officer do? At the least, she will not submit an 
application below the threshold of two and will aim for a higher threshold that will increase the 
likelihood of the warrant being granted. How low the officer will go (how close to two) depends on the 
cost to the officer of submitting a warrant application, including any cost to the officer from a rejected 
application. If this cost is low, the officer will submit applications that are closer to the minimal 
threshold (closer to two). If this cost is high, the officer will submit only strong warrant applications. In 
fact, if the cost of submitting an application is substantial, overdeterrence may result, with officers 
forgoing justified warrant applications (and justified searches and seizures). Cf. Tetlock, Skitka & 
Boettger, supra note 131, at 638 (explaining that, when unable to anticipate the views of those to whom 
they are accountable, decisionmakers “engage in preemptive self-criticism in which they tr[y] to 
anticipate the various objections that potential critics could raise”). 
147  See NYPD STOP & FRISK REPORT, supra note 103, at 164 (finding that, in over 15% of the 
cases, the reasons given for a frisk—a lower level of intrusion than a full-blown search—were 
insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion). 
148  See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983) (requiring affidavits to provide a magistrate with 
a “substantial basis” to issue a warrant); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965) (setting 
standards for affidavits in warrant applications). 
149  See Calabresi, supra note 49, at 117 (referring to the most impetuous officers as “cowboy” 
cops). 
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d. Ex ante vs. ex post.—Doesn’t the current availability of ex 
post review achieve the same benefits as an ex ante warrant requirement? 
Under the current deterrence model, the decisions of officers are still 
subject to review—ex post review by a judge in a suppression hearing. 
Wouldn’t the prospect of such review similarly induce police officers to 
make better decisions and search only when the search meets constitutional 
standards? 
The answer is “no” or at least “not as much.” The reason why harkens 
back to the shortcomings of the current deterrence model as detailed in Part 
I and specifically to the problem of ineffective remedies. Weak remedies 
prevent the current system from inducing compliance by police officers. In 
particular, the ex post bias plays a key role in undermining the dominant 
exclusion remedy. It results in judges adjusting their standards to police 
conduct rather than vice versa. This problem is avoided in the ex ante 
warrant model. Moreover, while in the current deterrence model judicial 
review comes after the fact, if it ever comes, in the warrant model officers 
cannot search without first obtaining a warrant. They must therefore take 
the prospect of magistrate review more seriously. 
III. WARRANTS AND EX POST REMEDIES 
Requiring warrants has a final benefit, which is that it actually 
enhances existing sanctions in ways that help achieve deterrence. Police 
officers still must be deterred from flouting the warrant requirement. But 
the shift is from a deterrence model that targets the actual search decision to 
a deterrence model that targets the decision to seek a warrant. This shift 
provides a relatively bright-line rule that can allow ex post sanctions to 
work.150 
As explained in Part I above, the existing deterrence model faces two 
main obstacles: vague standards and ineffective sanctions. A serious ex ante 
warrant requirement addresses these obstacles. First and foremost, it offers 
a clearer standard and thus reduces the vagueness problem.151 Second, 
because the efficacy of the sanctions is inversely related to the vagueness of 
the standard, the clearer standard also reduces the ineffective sanctions 
problem. Third, an ex ante warrant requirement even helps with the 
problem of testilying. These points are developed below. 
 
150  The comparison between the permission model and the existing deterrence model resembles the 
comparison between ex ante regulation and ex post liability. See Shavell, supra note 43, at 271. An 
implicit assumption in the literature on regulation versus liability is that actors adhere to the regulation. 
In many cases, compliance with the ex ante regulation—the warrant requirement in the Fourth 
Amendment context—is not guaranteed and, in fact, requires the threat of ex post liability. 
151  In theory, standards applied under the current system could be also clarified. But, as explained 
above, the ex post bias powerfully pushes towards greater vagueness. 
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A. A Clearer Standard 
To the extent the existing deterrence model fails because of the 
uncertainty of Fourth Amendment doctrine—and it often does—the warrant 
model provides a much clearer benchmark for evaluating officer conduct. 
Indeed, given the frequency with which “reasonableness” is employed at 
present, moving to a warrant model is akin to replacing an extremely vague 
and malleable standard with a sharp rule. All searches will require warrants 
unless exigency prevents it. Moreover, even as to exigency, the officer’s 
first task would be to stabilize the situation and then seek permission for 
further intrusion. Many commentators have suggested simplifying the law 
in just this way.152 
With a clearer standard, deterrence will work better. To see this, recall 
the example comparing moderate uncertainty to extreme uncertainty.153 
Under moderate uncertainty, a court was equally likely to set the standard 
anywhere between four and six, such that increasing the care level by one 
unit reduced the chances of a police officer being found to be in violation 
by 50 percentage points. Under high uncertainty, a court was equally likely 
to set the standard anywhere between one and nine, such that increasing the 
care level by one unit reduced the chances of a police officer being found to 
be in violation by 12.5 percentage points. 
Now introduce remedies. Specifically, consider a strong remedy of 400 
and a weak remedy of 100. The benefit to the police officer from taking an 
extra unit of care is equal to the sanction multiplied by the reduction in the 
probability that the officer will be found in violation. With 2 levels of 
uncertainty—moderate and high—and 2 sanction levels—100 and 400—
there are 4 benefit levels, as depicted in Table 1. 
TABLE 1: MARGINAL BENEFIT OF CARE —FOUR CASES 


















152  See, e.g., Bookspan, supra note 9 (suggesting a presumptively unreasonable standard to create a 
more consistent search and seizure doctrine); Bradley, supra note 1 (advocating for an easily obtainable 
warrant for police guidance); Slobogin, supra note 9 (arguing that only the exigency and proportionality 
principles should govern search and seizure regulation). 
153  See supra Part I.A. 
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The officer will invest in care as long as the marginal benefit from an 
extra unit of care exceeds the marginal cost of that extra unit of care.154 
Assume that investment in care exhibits increasing marginal costs, as 
depicted in Figure 1 below. 






















Starting with the obvious, with strong remedies and a standard that is 
only moderately uncertain, substantial, even excessive, deterrence is 
obtained. The benefit from an extra unit of care (b=200) is beyond the range 
of benefits in Figure 1. This high marginal benefit clearly exceeds the 
marginal cost of care for all six care levels depicted in the figure and for 
several additional care levels beyond the figure’s range. Strong remedies 
generate substantial deterrence, even with a high level of uncertainty. The 
marginal benefit of fifty exceeds the marginal cost of care for the first five 
units of care. 
But, as we have seen, Fourth Amendment remedies are not strong. 
With weak remedies and a highly uncertain standard, the care level will be 
low. Specifically, with weak remedies and high uncertainty the benefit from 
an extra unit of care is only 12.5. This marginal benefit exceeds the 
 
154  We assume throughout that the police officer is sufficiently rational to make these 
straightforward cost–benefit comparisons. 
b=50 
b=12.5 
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marginal cost of care only for the first unit of care. Reducing the degree of 
uncertainty—from high to moderate—fixes the problem. Even with weak 
remedies, a standard that is only moderately uncertain creates a benefit of 
fifty from an extra unit of care. This marginal benefit exceeds the marginal 
cost of care for the first five units of care. 
B. More Effective Sanctions 
Moving to a strict ex ante warrant model also will enhance the 
effectiveness of ex post sanctions. The sanctions that will deter police 
officers from violating the warrant requirement are the same sanctions used 
in the current deterrence model: indirect sanctions—exclusion and, to some 
extent, damages imposed on the police department or the city—and direct 
damages imposed on police officers, to the extent that these exist. As 
explained in Part I above, these sanctions, at present, are weak. 
Figure 1 demonstrates the symbiotic nature of standards and remedies. 
Even if remedies are themselves weak, simply clarifying the standard can 
make them effective. But as it happens—and perhaps it is no accident—
there are legal and structural reasons why addressing the vagueness of the 
standard will actually strengthen the effectiveness of the remedies. 
First, consider direct sanctions against the officer. At present, officers 
are shielded from liability by the rules governing official immunity; there is 
no liability except in the case of a violation of a clearly established rule.155 
Given the vagueness and uncertainty surrounding existing Fourth 
Amendment standards, it does not take much doctrinal analysis to see why 
police officers often escape liability. Now suppose, however, those officers 
must get warrants except in carefully delineated exceptions. Yes, there will 
be litigation surrounding some issues, such as what is a search and what 
circumstances constitute exigency. But these are the right discussions to 
have, and in many cases will not arise at all. Rather, in the vast run of cases 
the question will be only: was a warrant obtained? When officers fail to get 
warrants, monetary liability is a real possibility, even against officers if they 
are not shielded from bad faith violations of the law. 
Note that the very same logic applies, although to a lesser extent, to the 
indirect sanction of exclusion. There is a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s most recent cases casting 
doubt on the viability of exclusion have occurred in good faith cases.156 But 
when officers fail to obtain warrants now, violating a clear requirement, 
good faith claims will be less plausible. By making the standard clear, the 
legal rule allows the previously ineffective sanctions to kick in. 
 
155  See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text. 
156  See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (holding that good faith recordkeeping 
errors do not trigger the exclusionary rule); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995) (holding that good 
faith clerical errors by the county clerk do not trigger the exclusionary rule). 
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There is even reason to suppose the same might be true of institutional 
liability. Recall that municipalities are only liable at present for “policy” 
decisions. These decisions must come from a policy maker.157 But if the 
police in jurisdiction X are not obtaining warrants on a regular basis, it is 
going to be much easier for litigants to raise the claim that this sort of 
instruction must be coming from the top. 
C. Deterring Police Perjury 
Finally, the ex ante warrant model helps address the problem of police 
perjury. The magistrate’s decision is based on the facts described in the 
warrant application. By distorting these facts, the police officer can 
manipulate the magistrate and secure a warrant that would not be granted 
under the true facts of the case. Obviously, such perjury undercuts the 
permission model, reducing the benefits from shifting discretion to 
magistrates and interfering with the attempt to improve decisionmaking by 
the police. For the permission model to work, police perjury must be 
deterred. 
As described in Part I above, the problem of police perjury, or 
testilying, is a real one. In fact, this problem is a significant reason for the 
failure of the current deterrence model, alongside the vague standards and 
ineffective remedies problems. But replacing one type of police perjury in 
the current deterrence model with another type of police perjury in the ex 
ante warrant model would hardly be an improvement. The warrant model 
holds promise only if it can more effectively deal with its brand of police 
perjury. 
Requiring warrants can aid in preventing police perjury. William 
Stuntz made this basic point in a classic article.158 As Stuntz explained, in 
the current deterrence model, and particularly with the exclusionary rule as 
the primary remedy, police officers have a unique ability to commit 
perjury.159 The police can and do lie because of two related features of the 
current deterrence model. First, because the Fourth Amendment is enforced 
through ex post suppression hearings, pitting the police officer against a 
guilty defendant, there exists a “credibility gap,” as Stuntz puts it, which 
enables the officer to strain the truth.160 Again, borrowing from Stuntz: “[A] 
natural and fair skepticism about defendants’ honesty creates the potential 
for a good deal of dishonesty by the police.”161 Second, the timing of the 
suppression hearing, after all the facts are known, is conducive to police 
 
157  See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988) (citing Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 
U.S. 469, 483 (1986)). 
158  See Stuntz, supra note 2. 
159  See id. at 914. 
160  Id. 
161  Id. at 915; see also id. (“This risk of police perjury is unavoidable in an exclusionary rule 
system, since that system enforces the fourth amendment in disputes between officers and criminals.”). 
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perjury. It is easier to lie without getting caught when all objectively 
provable facts are known and the lie can be tailored to avoid conflicts with 
these provable facts.162 Stuntz concludes that the problem is structurally 
inherent in the current deterrence model when enforced by the exclusionary 
rule. A structural problem requires a structural solution. This solution, 
Stuntz argues, lies in the warrant requirement.163 
The warrant requirement addresses the two problems that arise from 
the ex post nature of the suppression hearing. By replacing the ex post 
suppression hearing with an ex ante warrant hearing, the permission model 
eliminates the pro-police bias. The officer no longer confronts a guilty 
defendant. The individual against whom the warrant is to be issued may 
well be innocent. A judge in a suppression hearing may tacitly permit lying 
when the lie enables her to convict a guilty defendant.164 A magistrate in a 
warrant hearing will more closely scrutinize the police officer’s story to 
protect the potentially innocent subject of the requested warrant. Moreover, 
the ex ante timing of the warrant hearing makes lying objectively more 
difficult. As Stuntz eloquently puts it, the ex ante nature of the warrant 
hearing “makes perjury somewhat harder, since the officer cannot so easily 
manufacture details consistent with a story he does not yet know.”165 
These arguments do not alleviate all concerns about police perjury. 
They suggest, however, that an ex ante warrant model is structurally more 
resistant to and deterrent of police perjury. This resistance constitutes 
another advantage of the ex ante warrant model as compared to the current 
deterrence model. 
IV. IMPLEMENTING WARRANTS 
Relying on warrants to the extent advocated here is a shift from 
existing law. Although the Supreme Court continues to pay lip service to 
the warrant requirement—albeit less and less vigorously—in practice, that 
requirement is more honored in the breach. By this juncture, the merits of a 
strict ex ante warrant model should be apparent. Nonetheless, there are no 
doubt questions about whether such a requirement is really necessary, what 
it would look like in practice, and whether adopting it is even feasible. This 
Part addresses those sorts of detail-driven, practical questions. 
A. Reducing Unconstitutional Conduct 
The chief reason to move to a strict ex ante warrant model is to avoid 
unconstitutional violations of liberty. But is this really a problem? Theory 
suggests yes, but is there any evidence? 
 
162  See id. 
163  See id. at 915–16. 
164  See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
165  Stuntz, supra note 2, at 915. 
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As it happens, there is evidence that police search individuals at higher 
rates than the Constitution permits. If this evidence holds up to scrutiny, 
and if the constitutional mandate is to be taken seriously, then assuming one 
buys the foregoing argument that warrants may be more effective than the 
current remedial scheme, it is worth considering a switch. 
Police recordkeeping practices and secrecy make it difficult to obtain 
information about the searches that occur, let alone whether those searches 
were fruitful. To put the problem simply, data on searches and warrants are 
scarce. As others have observed, police officials have a remarkable 
penchant for secrecy, making it almost impossible to obtain information 
about the most basic aspects of policing.166 There is no good source for how 
many searches occur each year in the United States or even in most 
jurisdictions. In part, this may be because the definition of what constitutes 
a search is itself a bit fuzzy.167 But failure to keep records or reveal them is 
the more likely the reason. And perhaps this is understandable: the warrant 
requirement is still embedded in law, so data on unwarranted searches 
might involve some admission of culpability. 
Still, there is evidence that unconstitutional searches take place, some 
of which would be deterred by a warrant requirement taken seriously and 
some of which might not (but which are still telling of police malfeasance). 
Gould and Mastrofski report on results of a study they conducted of first-
hand observation of police officers on the beat. They found that some 30% 
of police searches were unconstitutional.168 Their estimating technique was 
conservative, favoring the officers.169 More to the point, it is impossible to 
read the narratives of what police officers did in “Middleburg” and believe 
the police would have called a magistrate to ask permission to do much of 
it.170 
 
166  See, e.g., Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior 
Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315, 316 (2004) (“Most of the [search] 
research has been limited to secondary, indirect data sources, making it difficult to ascertain the true 
scope of the problem.”); Noah Kupferberg, Transparency: A New Role for Police Consent Decrees, 
42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 129, 146 (2008) (“[T]he data released in [the consent decree] 
jurisdictions is extremely raw and difficult to work with . . . [,] tends to be quite shallow . . . [,] [and] the 
bulk of the raw data is never released . . . .”); Robert H. Whorf, Consent Searches Following Routine 
Traffic Stops: The Troubled Jurisprudence of a Doomed Drug Interdiction Technique, 28 OHIO. N.U. L. 
REV. 1, 20 (2001) (“[L]aw enforcement agencies do not maintain any records that would provide 
information on the numbers of traffic stops that turn into criminal investigations. . . . [T]hey do not have 
any data upon which to determine the frequency of . . . the routine traffic stop turned consent search.”). 
167  See, e.g., Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (defining what is an impermissible search of a 
home as resting on technology that is “not in general public use”); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 453 
(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (resting definition of search on regular conduct of people). 
168  Gould & Mastrofski, supra note 166, at 331. 
169  Id. at 330 (“[W]hen the reliability of a source was in question, or the law was in flux, we erred 
on the side of the officers and coded searches as constitutional.”). 
170  In one case, four police officers lacking reasonable suspicion surrounded a black male in his late 
twenties who was riding a bike. The officers, while interrogating the man about potential drug 
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The data we have from New York’s stop and frisk practices suggest 
similar overzealousness on behalf of police officials. The Supreme Court 
deems stop and frisks less intrusive than full-blown searches and seizures, 
and requires a lesser degree of cause—reasonable cause or articulable 
suspicion rather than probable cause.171 Given the circumstances under 
which they occur, stop and frisks are likely to fall outside the warrant 
requirement. Still, they are indicative of police conduct. Based on the 
reports of police themselves, an audit of stop and frisks found that 15.4% of 
the stops failed to meet constitutional standards of reasonable suspicion, 
and another 23.5% of the stops had insufficient information for 
constitutional assessment.172 Thus, fully 39% of the stops were unjustified 
by legal standards. The percentage of stops that did not articulate reasonable 
suspicion was even higher for minority groups.173 
Another source of skepticism about police conduct are the “hit rates” 
from certain search and seizure policies. To be clear, it is important not to 
conflate hit rates alone with efficacy. Just as it is wrong to suggest 
magistrates are rubber stamps just because they grant most warrant 
requests, it may be that searches with low hit rates are efficacious 
nonetheless and that in fact the practice itself deters misconduct. Thus, for 
example, drug interdiction efforts on interstate buses may serve to keep 
drugs off those buses. 
Hit rates nonetheless are indicative. Even if efficacious, the 
Constitution still prohibits searches and seizures without sufficient cause, 
and low hit rates do suggest the level of cause was not sufficiently high. 
(Moreover, for what it is worth, by most empirical measures, all the 
searching and seizing for drugs has done virtually nothing to stop the 
constant flow of drugs into and through the country.)174 
While police departments track results of searches even more rarely 
than they track searches themselves, the evidence from racial profiling and 
auto stops suggests that police search far more often than constitutional 
standards permit. For example, the Constitution permits searching 
whenever there is probable cause to do so. Probable cause does not require 
that police be certain. In fact, it probably does not require they be right even 
 
possession, searched his knapsack without consent. When nothing was uncovered, the police then 
performed a full-body cavity search. See id. at 350–51. 
171  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
172  NYPD STOP & FRISK REPORT, supra note 103, at xiii–xiv. 
173  Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in 
New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 482 (2000). 
174  Data on illicit drug flow is hard to collect for obvious reasons. However, it can be estimated 
from total seizures and arrests. For seizures, see U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE NAT’L DRUG INTELLIGENCE 
CTR., National Drug Threat Assessment (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/
pubs38/38661/38661p.pdf. Arrests for drug offenses have also remained fairly constant since 2002. See 
Stats & Facts, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., http://www.justice.gov/dea/statistics.html#arrests 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2012). 
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half the time.175 But whatever the threshold for probable cause, it appears 
that often the threshold is not met. 
The data on traffic stop searches indicates that police find evidence in 
only about 10% to 20% of the total traffic searches.176 And these numbers 
are likely overestimates, as police have every incentive to record searches 
that result in hits and much less incentive to record unfruitful searches.177 
These sorts of numbers seem plainly below the constitutional probable 
cause standard.178 
Bus search data is even more revealing of constitutional violations. 
Police officers regularly walk onto interstate buses and invite individuals to 
 
175  See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 
160 (1949), and refusing to quantify probable cause as a percentage); Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 174 
(defining probable cause as a reasonable belief that varies with the circumstances). 
176  See GARY CORDNER ET AL., VEHICLE STOPS IN SAN DIEGO: 2001, at 31 (2002), available at 
http://www.sandiego.gov/police/pdf/stoprpt.pdf (finding a 13.3% average hit rate and only an 8.7% 
average drug hit rate in San Diego traffic stops). Combined Illinois data from 2009 and 2010 indicate a 
21% hit rate in consent searches that resulted from traffic stops. ALEXANDER WEISS & DENNIS P. 
ROSENBAUM, ILLINOIS TRAFFIC STOPS STATISTICS ACT 2010 ANNUAL REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
10 (2011), available at http://www.dot.il.gov/travelstats/2010 ITSS Executive Summary.pdf; 
ALEXANDER WEISS & DENNIS P. ROSENBAUM, ILLINOIS TRAFFIC STOPS STATISTICS STUDY: 2009 
ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2010), available at http://www.dot.state.il.us/travelstats/ITSS 2009 Annual 
Report.pdf; see also INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, MINNESOTA STATEWIDE RACIAL PROFILING REPORT: 
ALL PARTICIPATING JURISDICTIONS 22 (2003), available at http://www.irpumn.org/uls/resources/
projects/aggregate report 92303.pdf (finding 17.1% hit rate); Illya D. Lichtenberg, Voluntary Consent or 
Obedience to Authority: An Inquiry into the “Consensual” Police-Citizen Encounter 170 (Oct. 1999) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University) (on file with Northwestern University Law 
Review) (finding a 12.9% hit rate from consent searches in his data set). Averaged data for 2006 through 
2008 from Los Angeles, however, indicate a 50.35% hit rate in city traffic stops. Arrest, Discipline, Use 
of Force, Field Data Capture, and Audit Statistics Reports, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, http://
www.lapdonline.org/special_assistant_for_constitutional_policing/content_basic_view/9016 (last visited 
May 21, 2012) (containing 2006 and 2007 reports); Special Assistant for Constitutional Policing, L.A. 
POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lapdonline.org/special_assistant_for_constitutional_policing (last visited 
May 21, 2012) (containing 2007 and 2008 reports). The LAPD data is clearly questionable on this 
measure as they include finding the vehicle as a hit. See Kupferberg, supra note 166, at 151 (“In the ‘If 
Search Was Conducted, What Was Discovered’ category, why was the subcategory ‘Nothing’ from the 
2002 report dropped in 2007, replaced by the nonsensical ‘Vehicle’ category (if one is searching a car, 
that is presumably a common finding)?”). If one accounts for the odd reporting by removing all of the 
“vehicle” hits and recalculating a new LAPD hit rate, then the jurisdiction affirms, rather than 
contradicts, the others. Between 2006 and 2008, the LAPD discovered items in an average of 14.6% of 
the vehicles that they searched once one excludes the vehicle itself being “discovered.” 
177  The San Diego consultants, while stopping short of suggesting intentional bias, hint at such 
problems when they note that “[o]f particular concern, it would appear from the data that non-
compliance in completing stop forms was a bigger problem in more ethnically-diverse and less-affluent 
divisions, possibly skewing the data.” CORDNER ET AL., supra note 176, at 2; see also Samuel R. Gross 
& Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. 
L. REV. 651, 659 (2002) (stating evidence that the Maryland road data was falsified by collecting 
officers). 
178  See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
§ 3.2(e) (4th ed. 2004 & Supp. 2011–2012) (discussing the “fair probability” standard). 
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“consent” to searches.179 Consent is in scare quotes for reasons we come to 
shortly—it is difficult to believe that what occurs is true consent, and few 
are the commentators who argue otherwise. But for present purposes, what 
is important is the staggering shortfall between the enormous burden these 
searches impose and their fruitfulness. One officer said that he boarded 
about one hundred buses in a year, but of the thousands of bus passengers 
subjected to delay and intrusion, only seven were arrested.180 Not only is 
this far below the probable cause standard discussed above, but there is also 
reason to believe that the legal standard rises when police are not 
investigating a specific crime but are simply looking for evidence of 
criminality.181 
As a final example, albeit one under a lower standard, the hit rates 
from New York’s stop and frisk program do not inspire confidence in 
current search practices. Originally, it took nine stops in the New York stop 
and frisk program to produce one arrest, and the ratio was a bit higher for 
minorities.182 The more recent evidence is that only between 4% and 6% of 
stops result in arrests,183 and, in some neighborhoods, the stop-to-arrest rate 
is 3% or less.184 There may be other reasons why police do not arrest 
besides a lack of cause, but the hit rates on evidence found in stops and 
frisks do not seem to meet the constitutional standard. Under Supreme 
Court precedent, the primary reason justifying frisking a suspect is public 
safety, such as a search for weapons. Yet, it appears that New York police 
found weapons in only 0.75% of the frisks they have conducted.185 As the 
Center for Constitutional Rights notes in its aggregate data, 97.6% of stops 
resulted in confiscating neither weapons nor contraband.186 Even with 
regard to contraband—largely drugs—the hit rates were between 1% and 
2%.187 Yet, under governing law, stopping is only permissible if there is 
 
179  See Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. 
CT. REV. 153, 153–54 (describing consensual encounters, such as those that occur on Greyhound buses, 
as “an important law enforcement tool”). 
180  United States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707, 710 (4th Cir. 1990). 
181  See generally 4 LAFAVE, supra note 178, § 9.5 (explaining the heightened requirement in the 
absence of a specific crime). 
182  See NYPD STOP & FRISK REPORT, supra note 103, at viii (covering a fifteen-month period in 
1998 and 1999). 
183  CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, RACIAL DISPARITY IN NYPD STOPS-AND-FRISKS 5 (2009), 
available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/reports/Report_CCR_NYPD_Stop_and_Frisk.pdf. 
184  Matthew Block, Ford Fessenden & Janet Roberts, Stop, Question and Frisk in New York 
Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/07/11/nyregion/
20100711-stop-and-frisk.html. 
185  CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 183, at 11–12. 
186  Id. at 13. 
187  Id. at 11–13. 
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reasonable belief of criminality, and frisking only if an officer reasonably 
believes she is dealing with an armed or dangerous suspect.188 
While the preceding evidence on searches raises serious concerns, data 
on the relatively small number of searches with warrants suggests that 
warrants work. Though warrants are rarely sought by law enforcement 
officials, extant data suggests that almost 90% of searches conducted 
pursuant to a search warrant turn up some contraband.189 To some extent, 
this finding is not surprising given that officers have a greater incentive to 
go through the warrant process when there is a good chance that evidence 
will be found. Following a similar logic, the success rate might fall if 
warrants are sought more frequently. But a larger point nonetheless 
remains: a granted warrant request suggests evidence will be found, 
something that is hardly the case in most unwarranted searches. 
The evidence suggests that police acting alone are more zealous than 
the Constitution permits. This should not be surprising; as established 
above, the police are mission-oriented and deterrence is not working very 
well. In Gould and Mastrofski’s discussion of “Middleburg,” for example, 
they make clear that the government had decided on aggressive policing to 
curtail drugs.190 Aggressive in this instance crossed over to unconstitutional, 
at least in certain cases. The degree of unconstitutional conduct only serves 
to emphasize the value of an insistence on warrants. 
B. The Domain of Warrants 
But when should warrants be required? Searches and seizures—actions 
that threaten Fourth Amendment rights—come in numerous shapes and 
sizes. Not all of these police actions are currently subject to the warrant 
requirement. Perhaps the realm of the warrant model should be expanded. 
On the other hand, if imposing a warrant requirement across the board is 
deemed too costly, there may be room for tailoring. This section considers 
some possibilities regarding the domain of the warrant requirement. 
1. What’s Not In?.—The most important limitation to the warrant 
requirement is exigency. Warrants will be required when circumstances 
allow but not required when they do not. It is this threshold that keeps much 
policing outside the warrant model and likely will even if it is strengthened. 
Two obvious examples are auto stops and the practice of stop and frisk. 
Regarding auto stops, it is true that police report when they stop 
automobiles, either just before or after the fact—a point we will discuss 
further shortly. Still, this notification does not allow time for prior approval. 
 
188  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
189  See VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 122, at 40. 
190  Gould & Mastrofski, supra note 166, at 336 (suggesting a relationship between the aggressive 
departmental tone towards drug enforcement, the community policing policy, and an “officer’s 
inclination to search suspects unconstitutionally”). 
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It is not anticipated this will change under the warrant model. The same is 
true of on-the-street sudden encounters, and even the frisk that follows is 
premised on the notion of necessary quick action.191 
Still, as noted above, technology does serve to limit the exigency 
exception. Consider simply the time differential between police going back 
to headquarters, preparing a warrant application, and then bringing it to a 
magistrate, as opposed to phoning in for a warrant. In this considerable time 
saved, many fewer searches will be excused from permission because of 
exigency. 
2. Arrests.—For the very reason that exigency precludes permission 
regarding many street encounters, it may be time to rethink the rules of 
arrest. Arrest for a felony or for breach of the peace—other than in the 
home or dwelling of another person—requires no warrant.192 This was the 
rule at common law and remains the rule now.193 But the reason for the rule 
rested in large part in exigency. Felonies were serious crimes, and one 
accused could be expected to flee the jurisdiction.194 Breaches of the peace 
required immediate intervention. However, for the same reasons that 
technology makes obtaining a warrant easier and quicker, it is at least worth 
considering whether obtaining the views of a neutral magistrate as to 
probable cause prior to arrest also makes sense. 
It is the high social cost of an unconstitutional arrest that motivates 
proposing to extend the warrant requirement to the arrest domain. Arrests 
are frequent: The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) arrested about 
157,000 people in 2006,195 while New York City arrests over 300,000 
people per year.196 The FBI estimates that 13.7 million people were arrested 
nationwide in 2002.197 Being taken into custody is arguably of much greater 
severity than searches currently covered by the warrant requirement—it 
likely is beyond the actual experience or adequate imagination of most 
reading this Article. 
 
191  Terry, 392 U.S. at 28 (discussing “the tempered act of a policeman who in the course of an 
investigation had to make a quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger, 
and took limited steps to do so”). 
192  See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 592 (1980). 
193  See Amar, supra note 1, at 764; Davies, supra note 13, at 627–28. 
194  In fact, at common law, most felonies were punishable by death. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *98; see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 13 (1985) (citing Blackstone for the 
proposition that all felonies were punishable by death at common law). 
195  INFORMATION TECH. DIV., L.A. POLICE DEP’T, WEEKLY CRIME & ARREST COMPARISON 
REPORT FOR THE 4 WEEKS ENDING - DECEMBER 16, 2006 (2006), available at http://www.lapdonline.
org/home/pdf_view/23946. 
196  NYS DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., DISPOSITIONS OF ADULT ARRESTS (2011). 
197  SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 344 (Kathleen Maguire ed., 2003), 
available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/section4.pdf. The following note accompanies the 
arrest table: “These data were compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation through the Uniform 
Crime Reporting (UCR) Program.” Id. 
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There is evidence that arrest rates are increasing, while the 
“productivity” of these arrests is decreasing. Low felony prosecutions in 
Atlanta, which reportedly include some extremely suspect charges, are 
placed on a “rocket docket” where the dismissal rate is more than four in 
ten.198 Nationwide, about one-fourth of such cases are dismissed.199 
Analyzing New York City arrest data, Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies note 
that the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) “order-maintenance 
policing” policy increased the number of citizen searches and arrests.200 But 
the policy also led to “a sharp decline in [those arrests’] quality and 
sustainability in court.”201 Many of the “declined prosecutions” originated in 
minority neighborhoods.202 “Overall, more than 140,000 cases completed in 
1998 ended in dismissals, an increase of 60% compared with 1993.”203 Of 
course, there are many reasons for dismissal, and there is no clear data on 
how many arrestees are released because of a lack of probable cause. 
Nonetheless, it does not make sense to require police to obtain prior 
approval before seizing marijuana, but not a person. 
All of this is somewhat complicated by the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Gerstein v. Pugh204 and the practice that has risen up around it. In 
Gerstein, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that arrest warrants were generally 
unnecessary but required that probable cause hearings occur “promptly” 
after being taken into custody.205 As the Court explained: 
Maximum protection of individual rights could be assured by requiring a 
magistrate’s review of the factual justification prior to any arrest, but such a 
requirement would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate law 
enforcement. Thus, while the Court has expressed a preference for the use of 
arrest warrants when feasible, it has never invalidated an arrest supported by 
probable cause solely because the officers failed to secure a warrant.206 
Although the raising of the exigency threshold suggests that a pre-
arrest warrant requirement might not be “an intolerable handicap” for the 
police in many cases, there is a question of whether it would now replace 
 
198  Steve Visser, Dismissal Rate Raises Questions About Process, ATLANTA J.–CONST., Feb. 28, 
2011, at B1 (noting an arrestee who was charged after “visiting a West Lake shade tree mechanic about 
a car he had fixed up for resale. Atlanta narcotics officers raided the house as [the arrestee] was leaving. 
They found 54 hits of cocaine hidden in its ceiling.”). 
199  See id. 
200  Fagan & Davies, supra note 173, at 462. 
201  Id. at 476. 
202  Id. 
203  Id. 
204  420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
205  Id. at 117–19, 125; see also Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (“[W]e 
believe that a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of 
arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.”). 
206  Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113 (citations omitted). 
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the probable cause hearing mandated by Gerstein. Such hearings have 
become a part of the regular practice of criminal law. 
As a formal matter, Gerstein itself suggests there is nothing 
constitutionally required about a post-arrest probable cause hearing. When 
confronted with whether appointment of counsel was necessary, the Court 
stated: 
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the probable cause 
determination required by the Fourth Amendment. The sole issue is whether 
there is probable cause for detaining the arrested person pending further 
proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably without an adversary 
hearing. The standard is the same as that for arrest. That standard—probable 
cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime—traditionally has been 
decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written 
testimony, and the Court has approved these informal modes of proof.207 
To the extent this is the case, extending the warrant requirement to all 
arrests, or at least to all nonexigent ones (and by the time someone is cuffed 
in the police car, exigency has typically lapsed), may result in a net savings 
of time. 
However, there are reasons to believe that something akin to the 
courtroom probable cause hearing might still take place. First, there are 
other tasks often accomplished simultaneously, be they arraignment or a 
bail hearing. Second, liberty is precious, and people should not be 
incarcerated even one day absent probable cause. As the Gerstein Court 
recognized, the probable cause standard is a far ways short of actual guilt.208 
Lacking even probable cause, custody is intolerable. 
3. Administrative Searches.—Some searches occur not because there 
is evidence of criminality but to deter it or avoid other harms. These are 
administrative or regulatory searches, and their sine qua non is that they 
need not be based on particular suspicion.209 But the Supreme Court made 
clear in Camara v. Municipal Court that warrants for administrative 
searches were available despite a somewhat awkward fit with the language 
of the Fourth Amendment.210 
The merit of warrants for administrative searches is that they could be 
used to ensure the randomness or universality of such searches (randomness 
and universality almost assuredly do not exist at present). This is a topic too 
 
207  Id. at 120 (footnote omitted). 
208  See id. at 121. 
209  See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004) (emphasizing the “lack [of] individualized 
suspicion” in “information-seeking . . . stops”); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–44 
(2000) (distinguishing programmatic checkpoints, where individualized suspicion is not required, from 
searches aimed at “ordinary criminal wrongdoing”). 
210  387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967). 
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large for present purposes.211 But there are notable instances in which 
supposedly random policing seems distinctly nonrandom to observers.212 
Judicial supervision through administrative warrants could address this 
problem, but it is not being so used at present. 
4. Consent.—Finally, it is necessary to tackle the issue of consent. 
Consent is an “exception” to the warrant requirement in the sense that, if 
there is consent for a search, then, in effect, there has been no search at all. 
Searches require violation of a legitimate expectation of privacy, and, with 
consent, no legitimate expectation of privacy can be violated.213 
If only practice bore any relation to reality. It is now but the thinnest of 
fictions that consent has anything to do with voluntarily acceding to police 
intrusions into one’s privacy. Scores of commentators, and even some 
Supreme Court Justices, have recognized that “consent” has nothing to do 
with voluntariness of any sort.214 Long ago, the Supreme Court held that 
giving consent to search does not require being told that consent can be 
withheld.215 Since then, the Court has blessed as “consent” numerous tactics 
that are hard to stomach as such, like the bus searches and requests to 
search during traffic stops.216 As one victim of such a search said in a 
deposition when asked why he understood a request to get out of the car as 
a demand, “[I]f a policeman is to ask me something or tell me something, 
that’s an order.”217 For many people, this is the reality.218 Nor is it clear the 
 
211  It has been receiving recent attention. See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, Probabilities in Probable Cause 
and Beyond: Statistical Versus Concrete Harms, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 73 (2010) (arguing 
that searches based on a statistical probability of guilt are more likely to be perceived as Fourth 
Amendement violations than are searches based on concrete individualized suspicion, even when the 
probabilities of guilt are, in fact, equal); Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and 
the Fourth Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809 (2011) (arguing that randomization can satisfy the 
principles of the Fourth Amendment). 
212  See Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Discontinuance, Sultan v. Kelly, No. 09 CV 00698, 
2009 WL 4959352 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2009) (settling a claim that the NYPD’s subway search program 
uses racial profiling). 
213  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.22 (1967) (noting that there would be no 
reasonable expectation of privacy if consent was given); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593–94 
(1946) (finding that voluntary consent exempted search from Fourth Amendment requirements). 
214  See supra note 25 (discussing the much-decried Court jurisprudence on consent searches). 
215  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231 (1973) (holding that it would be “thoroughly 
impractical to impose” a per se warning requirement and require subjects to know that they had the right 
to refuse to a consent search). 
216  See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206–08 (2002) (upholding a bus interdiction search 
and holding that a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the police encounter when asked for 
consent during bus sweeps); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 439–40 (1991) (upholding search 
that occurred during a bus interdiction effort by suggesting that no seizure took place before consent was 
requested). There is good reason to question the apparently empirical conclusion by the Court that 
reasonable people would feel free to terminate the encounter. 
217  Deposition of Charles B. Carter at 24, Carter v. Md. State Police, No. 03-C-96-000156 
(Baltimore Cnty. Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 1996) (on file with Northwestern University Law Review) 
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Supreme Court would want it any different: cooperation with police 
authorities is generally desirable. 
The difficulty is that “consent” threatens to undermine the warrant 
requirement. Increasingly, police are relying on “consent” (yes, the 
continued use of scare quotes is entirely deliberate) to obtain access to 
places they otherwise could not go and in circumstances when there is no 
lawful cause to go there anyway. If the Supreme Court’s empirical 
understanding of when people truly provide consent is as wrong as most 
believe, then police can simply coerce their way into searching without a 
warrant simply by dint of authority. 
The truth is that people consent so often that it undermines both the 
meaningfulness of the consent and the believability that the police are really 
respecting the doctrine. Some of the traffic studies find that between 85% 
and 90% of drivers consent to searches of their vehicle.219 In one six-month 
period, the LAPD asked 16,228 drivers for consent to search their vehicles; 
16,225 said yes, while 3 said no. In the same period, 99.9% of pedestrians 
stopped consented to searches when asked.220 As Justice Stevens eloquently 
stated (albeit in dissent), “Repeated decisions by ordinary citizens to 
surrender that interest cannot satisfactorily be explained on any hypothesis 
other than an assumption that they believed they had a legal duty to do 
so.”221 
The tension between the warrant requirement and the consent 
exception becomes even clearer when it is recognized that both are about ex 
ante permission. The warrant requirement is a requirement to obtain 
permission from a magistrate to search. The consent exception implies that 
permission from the individual who is to be searched is a valid substitute. 
As shown above, the individual who is to be searched is often not in a 
position to offer genuine consent to permit the search. Hence, permission 
must be obtained from the magistrate. The warrant requirement can thus be 
viewed as a response to the failure of consent. 
 
(subsequently settled); see also Evidence Mounts that Police Target Minorities Excessively, USA 
TODAY, June 3, 1999, at 14A (discussing Carter case and settlement). 
218  See David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth Amendment’s Seizure 
Standard, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 51, 73 (2009) (conducting a survey of random citizens 
revealing that people would not feel free to end their police encounters, even in circumstances where the 
Supreme Court asserts that they may); Nadler, supra note 179, at 155–56 (discussing evidence that 
individuals do not feel free to refuse consent during bus searches). 
219  See WEISS & ROSENBAUM, supra note 176, at 12 (showing an average of 84.8% of drivers 
consent when asked in two studies); Lichtenberg, supra note 176, at 199 (finding 89.3% of drivers 
consent when asked). 
220  L.A. POLICE DEP’T, ARREST, DISCIPLINE, USE OF FORCE, FIELD DATA CAPTURE & AUDIT 
STATISTICS & THE CITY STATUS REPORT COVERING PERIOD OF JAN. 1, 2006–JUNE 30, 2006, at 8 (2006), 
available at http://www.lapdonline.org/home/pdf_view/33233. 
221  Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 48 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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What is to be done is more complicated, but there are several options 
suggested by commentators. Some insist on the police informing people 
they do not need to consent.222 Though if experience with the Miranda 
warnings is instructive here, such information will prove meaningless.223 
Police have learned to “condition” subjects to hear the command and 
disregard it as irrelevant information.224 Other commentators have suggested 
that the police require consent in writing, along with information that it 
need not be forthcoming.225 In the one jurisdiction that has experimented 
with this option (by judicial consent decree), the number of searches 
dropped notably, which might suggest it is an effective option.226 
A third possibility is to simply use magistrates and available 
technology to obtain consent. In situations in which the police lack 
sufficient cause to obtain a warrant or conduct any intrusion, they can call 
in the consent request like a warrant. It is easy enough for a magistrate on 
the line to inform a person they need not consent and to ensure the person 
wishes to do so. One suspects that the number of such requests will be 
vanishingly small, and the number granted even smaller, an indication itself 
that what has been called “consent” is not true consent. But if consent is 
requested and forthcoming under the suggested regime, then ex post 
disputes about whether it was voluntary should themselves be vanishingly 
rare. 
C. How Many More Warrants? 
As this review of the domain suggests, taking the warrant requirement 
seriously will require a lot more warrants. The question therefore is how 
many more warrants will be required, followed, no doubt, by whether 
accomplishing this is even possible. 
Determining how many more warrants will be required under the 
permission model is difficult. A first-cut estimate would take the total 
number of searches currently conducted each year and subtract the number 
 
222  See, e.g., Steven L. Chanenson, Get the Facts, Jack! Empirical Research and the Changing 
Constitutional Landscape of Consent Searches, 71 TENN. L. REV. 399, 466 (2004) (arguing that 
informing subjects of their right to refuse “can’t hurt” (quoting Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, 
Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 YALE L.J. 1739, 1745 (1994))); Robert H. Whorf, “Coercive 
Ambiguity” in the Routine Traffic Stop Turned Consent Search, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 410 (1997) 
(suggesting that being informed that one is free to go should be a firm rule in consent search settings). 
223  See Lichtenberg, supra note 176, at 234 (discussing the similarities between empirical research 
showing the minute effect of verbal consent warnings and the research surrounding Miranda’s 
insubstantial effect on rates of confession). 
224  See id. at 260–63 (describing police tactics used to generate consent). 
225  See David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and 
Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 364 (2001) (“All consent requests should 
be recorded, and all consents should be in writing and signed by the driver, passenger, or pedestrian who 
was stopped.”). 
226  See infra notes 255–60 and accompanying text. 
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of warrants that currently are being obtained. This estimate would then need 
to be adjusted upward for any new areas in which warrants would be 
required (such as arrests). And then adjusted downward to account for the 
self-screening effect of the warrant requirement, such as police officers’ not 
asking for warrants that will not be granted. 
1. A First-Cut Estimate.—Even a first-cut estimate proves to be 
elusive. To put the problem simply, in light of police secrecy and defects in 
recordkeeping, data on searches and warrants is scarce. Nonetheless, there 
are sources from which one can extrapolate, reaching some rough (and very 
wide-ranging) estimates. Most illuminating are the few jurisdictions that 
make large sets of automobile data available. Typically, the impetus for this 
data collection is concern over racial profiling, which leads to judicial or 
legislative mandates.227 There also is data from the Department of Justice, 
which conducts occasional national surveys measuring citizens’ contacts 
with police officers.228 In addition to a few academic studies, data on arrests 
rounds out the oeuvre, although, as explained above, arrests may or may not 
come within the domain of an enhanced warrant requirement. 
In estimating the total number of searches, we start with traffic-stop 
searches, where data is most readily available. The traffic monitoring and 
consent decree studies show tens of thousands of traffic-stop searches 
occurring in major American cities. For example, the LAPD conducted an 
average of 71,540 traffic-stop searches per year, or about 0.0188 per capita, 
between 2006 and 2008; the San Diego Police Department conducted 
15,356 searches, or about 0.0126 searches per capita, in 2001; and in 
Minneapolis, 10,277 searches, or 0.0276 per capita, were performed in 
2002.229 Extrapolating from the local traffic-stop data, fully recognizing the 
difficulties that such extrapolation might involve, we cautiously estimate 
that each year about three million searches take place in the United States 
during routine traffic stops.230 
 
227  See, e.g., Kupferberg, supra note 166, at 132 (noting that concern over racial profiling “led to 
numerous consent decrees designed to prevent racial profiling by police”). 
228  See, e.g., MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ERICA L. SMITH & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2005 (2007), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf. 
229  Data on the number of searches conducted is taken from consent decree reports available at 
INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, supra note 176, at 4 (discussing Minneapolis); L.A. POLICE DEP’T, supra 
note 176; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-00-41, RACIAL PROFILING: LIMITED DATA 
AVAILABLE ON MOTORIST STOPS 50 (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/gg00041.pdf 
(discussing the San Diego Police Department). Population figures, used in the per-capita searches 
calculations, are taken from the Census website. See generally State & County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/ (last visited May 21, 2012). 
230  The extrapolation technique used is the following: For each one of the three jurisdictions—LA, 
San Diego, and Minneapolis—we took the average number of searches when there were multiple years 
of data, divided this number by the population in the jurisdiction to obtain per-capita search rates, and 
then multiplied by the total U.S. population. A total U.S population figure of 309 million was taken from 
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Estimating the number of searches outside of the traffic-stop context—
pedestrian searches and searches conducted in homes or other structures—is 
more difficult. The best that can be done with available data involves rough, 
indirect estimation of the total number of searches. The best data available 
is from the LAPD, which is the only jurisdiction subject to a consent decree 
that mandated non-vehicle-stop search data collection.231 In the LAPD data, 
auto-stop searches comprised 35% of total searches.232 If traffic-stop 
searches represent a similar ratio in other jurisdictions, and we utilize our 
 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 229. An alternative extrapolation technique, based on the number of 
sworn police officers, rather than on population figures, yielded similar results. Data on the number of 
sworn officers in each of the three jurisdictions and aggregate U.S. figures was taken from the Uniform 
Crime Reports’ Law Enforcement Personnel section. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Full-Time Law 
Enforcement Employees by State, 2009, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2009 (Sept. 2010), http://
www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_77.html (last visited June 3, 2012). A third approach for 
obtaining total U.S. search figures is based on available estimates. Specifically, we found several 
estimates of the total number of traffic stops in the U.S., ranging from 43 million to 58 million. We also 
found several estimates of traffic-stop search rates from several jurisdictions ranging from 4.3% to 
6.8%. Multiplying the total number of traffic stops in the U.S. (more precisely, the mid-point of the 43-
million to 58-million range) by the search rate (more precisely, by the midpoint of the 4.3% to 6.8% 
range), yields an estimate of 2.55 million traffic stop related searches per year in the United States. For 
estimates of the total number of traffic stops in the U.S., see CORDNER ET AL., supra note 176, at 24 
(suggesting 57 million stops annually between 2000 and 2001); INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, supra note 
176, at 11–12 (suggesting 46.5 million stops in 2002); L.A. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 176 (combined 
studies for three years suggesting 48 million stops annually between 2006 and 2008); MD. STATISTICAL 
ANALYSIS CTR., GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF CRIME CONTROL & PREVENTION, EIGHTH REPORT TO THE 
STATE OF MARYLAND UNDER TR 25-113, at 8 (2010), available at http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/
msac/documents/TSDReport2010.pdf; MD. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR., GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF 
CRIME CONTROL & PREVENTION, SEVENTH REPORT TO THE STATE OF MARYLAND UNDER TR 25-113, 
at 4 (2009), available at http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/msac/documents/TSDReport2009.pdf 
(suggesting, with the 2010 Maryland report, supra, that there were 43 million stops annually between 
2008 and 2009); WEISS & ROSENBAUM, supra note 176 (two studies suggesting 58.3 million stops 
annually between 2009 and 2010). But see DUROSE, SMITH & LANGAN, supra note 228, at 1 (suggesting 
there were 29.4 million stops in 2005); Illya D. Lichtenberg & Alisa Smith, How Dangerous Are 
Routine Police–Citizen Traffic Stops?, 29 J. CRIM. JUST. 419, 423 (2001) (providing estimates of 60, 
120, or 160 million traffic stops per year). For search-rate estimates, see CORDNER ET AL., supra note 
176, at 16 (finding that an average of 6.75% of San Diego traffic stops resulted in a search between 2000 
and 2001); DUROSE, SMITH & LANGAN, supra note 228, at 1 (finding that 5% of traffic stops nationwide 
resulted in a search in 2005); MD. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR., supra, at 9 (finding that an average of 
3% of Maryland traffic stops resulted in a search between 2008 and 2009). But see INST. ON RACE & 
POVERTY, supra note 176, at 10, 19, 22 (indicating that 9.33% of Minnesota traffic stops resulted in a 
search in 2002); L.A. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 176 (indicating that an average of 12.06% of Los 
Angeles traffic stops resulted in a search between 2006 and 2008). 
231  See Consent Decree, United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 00-11769 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 
2001), available at http://court.cacd.uscourts.gov/CACD/RecentPubOp.nsf/ecc65f191f28f59b8825728
f005ddf4e/1105cebf2219a6a288256b48007a04c1/$FILE/cv00-11769.pdf. 
232  See, e.g., L.A. POLICE DEP’T, ARREST, DISCIPLINE, USE OF FORCE, FIELD DATA CAPTURE, 
AUDIT STATISTICS, AND NEW DIRECTIVES/POLICIES: COVERING PERIOD OF JULY 1, 2008–DECEMEBER 
31, 2008, at 4, 6 (2009), available at http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/FinalConsentDecreeRptJuly
December2008.pdf (showing that there were about 97,000 searches in a half-year period, 34,000 of 
which resulted from auto stops). 
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estimate of three million searches during traffic stops, then the total number 
of searches conducted in the United States each year needs to be increased 
to approximately 8.6 million (3 million divided by 0.35 equals 8.6 million). 
Then there are the things not included in this estimate, which would 
raise it. Most prominently, arrests would more than double the number. 
These figures also do not include federal searches. Finally, none of the bus 
interdiction numbers are included here, if they are in fact deemed searches. 
Of all these millions of searches, how many were conducted with a 
warrant? The little data that exists affirms the suspicion that warrants are 
the exception rather than the norm. Two studies from the 1980s suggest that 
warrants were rarely obtained. One study found that “the overwhelming 
majority of criminal investigations are conducted without recourse to a 
search warrant” and that few law enforcement officers sought warrants.233 
Another study looking at six jurisdictions, with a combined population of 
almost four million, found that only 2,115 search warrants were issued in a 
six-month period.234 A more recent study from 2004, observing police 
searches as they occurred, stated that “not a single search in the sample of 
115 was conducted by warrant.”235 According to the most recent data, from 
2011, the NYPD obtains only about 5,000 search warrants per year.236 
Extrapolating from this figure, fewer than 100,000 search warrants are 
obtained nationwide in a given year.237 
Comparing the 100,000 warrants to the 8.6 million searches—or over 
20 million if arrests are included—an awful lot more warrants would be 
required. Although this looks to be a big number, determining whether it is 
requires consideration of a number of factors. First, as noted above, the 
estimate for the total number of searches—the 8.6 million estimate—is only 
a first-cut estimate. Second, as with the question of arrests, there is room to 
adjust the domain. 
More importantly, it is necessary to determine what mitigates the size 
of the raw number. As we first explain, self-screening by the police can be 
expected to reduce substantially the number of total searches and thus the 
total number of additional warrants. Second, there is room to question the 
magnitude of the increased burden of warrants. 
2. Self-Screening.—If police officials must obtain warrants before 
searching and seizing, there is a likelihood that they will not search or seize 
 
233  VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 122, at 17. 
234  Craig D. Uchida & Timothy S. Bynum, Search Warrants, Motions to Suppress and “Lost 
Cases:” The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule in Seven Jurisdictions, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1034, 1051 (1991). 
235  Gould & Mastrofski, supra note 166, at 334. 
236  N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, INTELLIGENCE DIV., SAFETNET MONTHLY TOTALS 2008 (2011) (on file 
with author). 
237  The extrapolation takes the figure of 5,000 warrants, divides it by the New York City 
population, and then multiplies by the total U.S. population. 
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in the first place. This might occur because magistrates deny the warrants. 
But in equilibrium, in a well-operating system, the police will realize a 
warrant is not forthcoming and will not ask. This theoretical prediction 
from Part II finds support in the data. 
Comparing two jurisdictions in which traffic-stop data exists, there is 
evidence that a stringent ex ante warrant model can have a strong self-
screening effect. While the total search rate in L.A. was 0.053 per capita, in 
Pittsburgh it was only 0.006 per capita.238 Why does the LAPD search 
almost ten times as often? One possible answer is that the Pittsburgh 
consent decree imposed a near-warrant level requirement on searches and 
seizures. Pittsburgh police officers were required to record every search and 
seizure in elaborate detail, including the location, basis of the search, type 
of search conducted (warrantless, consent, etc.), demographic information 
about the search subject, and a description of what was searched.239 Subjects 
could only consent to searches after signing an officer’s written form 
explaining their right to refuse.240 
Pittsburgh’s decree monitors understood the impact of the consent 
decree, writing, “[S]upervisors and officers told us that officers were 
hesitant to conduct searches and to use force since the consent decree was 
signed. Of course, care in conducting searches and in the use of force was 
one of the goals of the decree.”241 Our comparative data affirm these 
assessments: Pittsburgh’s policing reforms resulted in fewer searches, as 
compared to other jurisdictions. Pittsburgh was performing about half as 
many total (auto and pedestrian) searches per capita than other jurisdictions 
were conducting per capita in the traffic-stop setting alone.242 What Part II 
 
238  See L.A. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 176 (L.A. figures); PUB. MGMT. RES., CITY OF PITTSBURGH 
AUDITOR’S QUARTERLY REPORTS (1997–2002), available at http://www.parc.info/consent_decrees_-
_memoranda_of_agreement_-_monitor_reports.chtml (Pittsburgh figures). Per-capita rates were 
calculated by dividing the number of searches by the population in the jurisdiction. Population figures 
were taken from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 229. 
239  ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., TURNING NECESSITY INTO VIRTUE: PITTSBURGH’S EXPERIENCE WITH 
A FEDERAL CONSENT DECREE 17–18 (2002), available at http://www.vera.org/download?file=239/
Pittsburgh%2Bconsent%2Bdecree.pdf. The contrast between Pittsburgh and the norm is best seen when 
one contrasts the strictness of the Pittsburgh search policy with the general police practice of 
opportunistic searching. See VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 122, at 68 (discussing tactics used by 
police to avoid warrants and searches via “consent” or as searches incident to arrest). 
240  DAVIS ET AL., supra note 239, at 18. 
241  Id. at 51. 
242  This is shown by comparing the total search rate in Pittsburgh—0.006 per capita—with the 
traffic-stop search rates reported earlier in the section. See supra text accompanying note 239. The 
Pittsburgh figure represents total searches performed by city officers during the time period. See DAVIS 
ET AL., supra note 239, at 17:  
As a result of the decree, the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police created the Field Contact/Search/Seizure 
Report. This report, which has multiple uses, goes beyond the requirements of the consent decree 
in some respects. In addition to capturing information about all searches (strip searches, 
warrantless searches, consent searches, etc.), it captures information regarding the seizure of any 
property resulting from a search and field interviews of persons stopped by the police. 
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suggests in theory seems to be borne out in practice: requiring officers to 
make a written justification makes a massive empirical difference. When 
the justification needs to be submitted to a magistrate, the difference might 
be even greater. 
Although there may be reason to doubt the sharp difference between 
Los Angeles and Pittsburgh, if this difference is at all correct, then 
excluding arrests, the number of additional warrants required would be one-
tenth, or roughly one million warrants. The two cities may be extremes on a 
continuum. Los Angeles officials may search more often than in most 
places. Pittsburgh officers may not have recorded all of their searches. Still, 
the data suggest a sharp decrease from our original estimate in the number 
of warrants needed under the permission model. 
It also is interesting to note that despite the decrease in searches, police 
performance in Pittsburgh did not substantially deteriorate during the 
consent decree. Police morale was unaffected and crime rates, including 
homicides, either stayed the same or continued to steadily decrease.243 
Officer activity on traffic-related matters remained relatively unchanged, 
and while felony clearance rates initially decreased, the rates bounced back 
to pre-decree levels towards the end of the decree.244 There is insufficient 
evidence to assess whether the Pittsburgh consent decree resulted in an 
overall increase or decrease in social welfare. But clearly the criminal 
justice system did not collapse or even suffer in any notable way. 
The Pittsburgh experience suggests that even if the warrant 
requirement were not adopted, there is good reason to require police 
officers to keep a record of when and why they are searching.245 At least 
some of the benefits of warrants apparently occur even without a 
magistrate.246 So long as the time exists to make a record, the advantages are 
considerable: police think before they act, aware that their actions are 
subject to ex post scrutiny, or simply consider more carefully what they are 
doing. And this recordkeeping provides a record against which to compare 
ex post testimony. 
3. Why the Costs of Warrants Are Not as They Appear.—Even after 
self-screening, a stringent ex ante warrant model would entail an increase in 
the number of warrants. What is the burden imposed by these additional 
 
Additionally, the Pittsburgh consent decree monitor believes that the reported Pittsburgh figures 
represent all of the searches by the department during the decree and noted departmental disciplinary 
mechanisms that were pursued after rare instances of noncompliance were observed by his team. See 
Telephone Interview with Dr. Jim Ginger, Consent Decree Monitor and CEO, Pub. Mgmt. Res. (Sept. 
23, 2011). 
243  See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 239, at 53–55. 
244  See id. at 53–56. Our conversations with the Pittsburgh consent decree monitor also confirmed 
this general trend. Telephone Interview with Dr. Jim Ginger, supra note 242. 
245  See supra Part IV.B.3. 
246  See supra Part II. 
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warrants? Although it is difficult to operationalize this quantitatively, there 
are a number of points that suggest the burden may not be nearly as great—
in gross or net—as one might believe is the case. To the contrary, there are 
a number of cost savings to be had. 
In assessing the costs of requiring many additional warrants, it is 
necessary to differentiate between costs borne by the police and costs borne 
by the judicial system (including judges and lawyers). The judicial system 
will incur greater ex ante costs but fewer ex post costs. And the burden on 
the police can be lessened from current practice in ways that seem to make 
sense. 
a. The judicial system. 
(1) Trading ex ante warrant efforts for ex post 
suppression efforts.—The chief point is that although 
the judicial system will incur greater costs in considering all of the 
additional warrant applications, there will be a concomitant savings with 
regard to post-search exclusion hearings. Under current practice, any 
defendant can seek to exclude evidence by filing a suppression motion. The 
exact number of suppression motions filed in the United States is difficult 
to figure, though multiple scholars have estimated that suppression motions 
are filed in about 10% of criminal cases.247 There are approximately 21 
million criminal cases in the United States each year.248 This is a 
considerable number of suppression motions. And it does not take much 
imagination to recognize that suppression motions consume a great deal 
more time of the bench and bar than do consideration of warrant requests.249 
If the warrant requirement is taken seriously, then the number of 
exclusion hearings likely will decrease, and those that occur will be 
 
247  See Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Costs of the Exclusionary Rule Revisited, 1987 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 223, 228 (“It appears from Table 1 that motions to suppress occur in about 10.2% of all cases, but 
this is slightly inflated because multiple motions are made in some cases. . . . These motions actually 
affect about 9.7% of all cases.”); Uchida & Bynum, supra note 234, at 1052 (finding that 13% of search 
warrants are contested by defendants via motions to suppress). 
248  ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF 
STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 20 (2010), available at http://
www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC-2008-Online.ashx. 
249  Simply comparing the percent of search warrant cases that have suppression motions filed to 
cases without warrants may lead to spurious conclusions. See, e.g., Steven Duke, Dialogue, Making 
Leon Worse, 95 YALE L.J. 1405, 1409 (1986) (“The 5% suppression rate for warrant searches in the 
NCSC study, therefore, was about five times as great as suppressions in felony cases in general, most of 
which involved warrantless searches.”). Given how rarely warrants actually are sought in the law 
enforcement context, see supra text accompanying notes 21–23, it stands to follow that police are likely 
to seek them in only the most important cases, see VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 122, at 82 (noting 
that officers tend to get warrants in cases where they want “just to be safe” before conducting the 
search). But if officers only seek warrants in big cases with big numbers, then those cases are also likely 
to be the most heavily litigated and the most likely to have suppression motions filed by aggressive 
defense counsel. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1670 
simplified. The current rule is that judges review police searches effectively 
de novo—generally not formally deferring to police factual assertions or 
fact-finding and certainly not as to legal conclusions—while magistrate 
decisions to issue a warrant are reviewed deferentially.250 Indeed, even if a 
warrant turns out to be faulty, evidence will be admitted under the “good 
faith” exception if the police officer did not misrepresent herself in the 
affidavit or if the affidavit is not so lacking that no reasonable police officer 
would have believed it was sufficient.251 (The latter standard is the law’s 
safeguard against “rubber stamp” magistrates who conduct no review.) 
It makes sense that if a warrant is obtained, the standards applied by 
the Supreme Court regarding the good faith exception will govern most 
exclusion hearings. So long as police officers obtain a warrant, any 
evidence uncovered will be admitted at the criminal trial unless the 
defendant can prove either that the officer lied in obtaining the warrant or 
that no reasonable police officer could have believed the warrant 
application was sufficient to establish the requisite level of cause.252 Besides 
this high bar, suppression motions will be filed only when warrants are not 
obtained. As a practical matter, this will involve litigation of essentially 
three issues: whether the police conduct constituted a “search” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment; whether exigency excused the failure 
to obtain a warrant; and perhaps whether a search was properly within the 
scope of a lawful arrest. 
While the cost of ex post hearings will go down, the number of ex ante 
warrant requests obviously will go up.253 But warrant proceedings equally 
obviously are far simpler affairs than suppression hearings. The former 
typically are ex parte, there is no briefing, and as we detail below, there are 
ways to make them more efficient yet. 
(2) Rethinking magistrates.—It also is possible that the 
extra magistrate time necessary to adopt a strict ex ante warrant requirement 
can be met in less expensive ways. The number of warrant applications 
required could swamp existing judicial capacity. The Fourth Amendment, 
however, does not require anything other than that magistrates be “neutral 
and detached.” Formally at least, they need not even be lawyers.254 There 
 
250  See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (granting “great deference” to a magistrate’s 
determination of probable cause (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969))). 
251  See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–24 (1984). 
252  We bracket here the question of whether probable cause is required for all warrants. 
253  The increase in the number of warrant applications will be tempered by police self-screening. 
See supra Part IV.C.2. 
254  Historically warrants were issued by justices of the peace, low-ranking judicial officers. See 
Davies, supra note 13, at 623–24. Today a similar function is filled by magistrates. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(b)–(c) (2006) (vesting magistrates with the power of judicial officers); A. Leo Levin & Michael E. 
Kunz, Thinking About Judgeships, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1643–44 (1995) (characterizing magistrates 
as adjunct judicial officers). 
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are many models of adopting judicial personnel to the cause of dispute 
resolution short of adding more judges. There are special masters, 
arbitrators, and the like, and there are of course the many administrative law 
judges.255 In practice, all that is required are individuals trained in Fourth 
Amendment law with enough independence to meet constitutional 
commands. American governance calls upon scores of administrative 
officials to ensure reliable process on matters far more trivial than the 
substantial violation of person or place involved in police searches and 
seizures. Surely it can do the same in this critical area, if in fact more 
magistrates are needed. 
Indeed, there may be real advantages to moving toward an 
“administrative magistrate” model. Many aspects of the American criminal 
justice system are over-politicized in not necessarily helpful ways.256 While 
some aspects of policing properly are under political control, the very fact 
of a judicial warrant requirement suggests this is one that should not be. 
Yet, many judges stand for election, and there is evidence that judicial 
preferences on warrants vary, perhaps more than the law would prefer. 
Well-trained administrative magistrates might actually achieve greater 
uniformity with regard to what justifies warrants. 
b. Police warrant practice.—Undoubtedly, the bulk of the 
burden will fall on police officials, who must seek warrants in far more 
cases. Even here, however, there are savings to be achieved. In truth, 
current warrant practice almost certainly is too onerous, and the advantages 
of modern technology have not been fully realized. 
It is easy when thinking of warrant practice to picture the detective of 
another era, sitting behind a wooden desk, banging out a warrant on a 
battered typewriter, the bottle of Wite-Out close at hand. While this is 
surely the image from a bygone era, there still may be some truth to the 
implicit burden. Warrant procedures are often highly formalized and 
involve a substantial amount of paperwork. Complaints about this from 
police and government officials are common.257 
 
255  See Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special Masters in the 
Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625, 677–84 (2002) (discussing the 
various types of judicial adjuncts and their role in dispute resolution). 
256  See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
1276, 1287 (2005) (discussing “tough on crime” politics and pressure to increase sentences); William J. 
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 509 (2001) (discussing the 
relationship between “tough on crime” politics and increased criminal prohibitions and harsher 
sentences). 
257  For a levelheaded, though somewhat dated, compilation of police complaints about the warrant 
process, see VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 122, at 82–87, 92, 108–11. Commonly noted are that 
different judges apply unpredictably different standards to warrant applications, that judges or 
prosecutors are too often unavailable when the warrant needs to be reviewed, and that there is 
insufficient clerical help to prepare after-hours warrants. Id. at 79–80, 108–10. In an off-the-record 
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Warrant practice should not be so onerous. If we want police officials 
to get warrants—and it should seem apparent at this juncture that we do—
then the process should be simplified so that warrants can be obtained 
efficiently. The chief goals of the warrant application process are to 
determine that the cause standard is met and to obtain a clear description of 
the place or person to be searched and what will be searched for. 
Technology should make obtaining warrants far, far easier. There is no 
reason to have everything documented on paper if it can be recorded on 
audio or video. Jurisdictions already are experimenting with these systems. 
Officers in Palm Bay, Florida, are using Skype to call in warrants for blood 
alcohol testing.258 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure recently were 
amended to make clearer the ready availability and acceptability of 
electronic technology.259 
Of course, there is a flipside to this technology, which is that it also 
makes getting warrants easier and more rapid, bearing upon the concept of 
exigency. In formal terms, exigency is defined as requiring action before a 
warrant can be obtained.260 But the ready availability of technology can 
raise the exigency threshold. Whereas obtaining a warrant once meant 
several hours traveling back to the station to prepare a warrant application, 
delivering it to the proper authorities, and waiting, now all of what is 
essential may be accomplished in an electronic conversation taking a matter 
of minutes. 
Indeed, one of the real merits of technology is that warrant applications 
do not need to be static hard-copy documents but can be dynamic 
exchanges between a magistrate and a police official. Magistrates can ask 
about missing information, question an officer’s priors, suggest an 
alternative hypothesis, and quiet doubts—as well as give direction about the 
scope of the search.261 All the benefits that the literature in Part II discussed 
can be obtained and enhanced by ready two-way conversation. 
There may well be instances in which more formal procedures are 
desired. Wiretap applications, national security applications, or major 
investigations may require paper documentation and a more elaborate 
 
conversation with one of the authors, NYPD personnel similarly mentioned the burdens of obtaining 
warrants. 
258  See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
259  See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
260  See Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392 (D.C. Cir 1970) (en banc) (“Terms like ‘exigent 
circumstances’ . . . are useful in underscoring the heavy burden on the police to show that there was a 
need that could not brook the delay incident to obtaining a warrant, and that it is only in the light of 
those circumstances and that need that the warrantless search meets the ultimate test of avoiding 
condemnation under the Fourth Amendment as ‘unreasonable.’”); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 
U.S. 740, 751–52 (1984) (citing Dorman as “a leading federal case defining exigent circumstances”). 
261  See VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 122, at 94–102 (outlining survey results showing different 
judicial views on how the warrant review should be conducted, how much the use of confidential 
informants by the police should be questioned, and what generally leads to rejected warrants). 
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approval mechanism. The point, however, is that none of this is necessary 
to meet the requisites of the Fourth Amendment, and, to the extent it chills 
the warrant process and causes police officials to act on their own, it may be 
undesirable. 
From a human resources perspective on both the police and judicial 
sides, it is worth considering that a practice already exists that is not far 
from the warrant model. When police officers make traffic stops, they 
already regularly call in to notify headquarters of what they are doing and 
then to run license, registration, and warrant checks. Indeed, today they 
typically do far more than that, including checking the criminal records of 
those stopped—not only drivers but passengers in some instances—walking 
around cars with drug dogs, and attempting to obtain “consent” to search. 
These computer checks are now a routine part of the traffic stop process.262 
With an estimated 50 million traffic stops in the United States per year, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the current system has demonstrated it can 
handle about 50 million of these checks and headquarters calls annually.263 
And though what is required for warrant processing is undoubtedly more 
complex, more discretionary, and more time-consuming, the differences 
should not be overstated.264 For many run-of-the-mill searches, police would 
do just what they do for traffic stops: call in and explain what they are about 
to do and why. 
4. Dispensing With Warrants?: Ex Ante Simultaneous 
Recordkeeping.—Indeed, it is this last point that brings up an 
alternative possibility to warrants altogether. Warrants are still preferred 
because they require the independent judgment of a magistrate. But should 
aspects of a stringent ex ante warrant requirement prove too costly—and in 
situations where exigency makes obtaining a warrant impossible—the 
Pittsburgh experiment suggests a readily available alternative that might be 
nearly as effective. 
Put simply, technology should be used to require police officers to 
make their own ex ante (or nearly contemporaneous) record of what they 
are doing and why. Police forces’ use of video technology is increasing. It 
not only permits observation of police conduct but can also be used to stave 
 
262  See Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” 
Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1874–86 (2004) (outlining types of record 
and warrant checks that courts have permitted to take place during traffic stops and the amount of time 
those checks can take). 
263  See supra note 229 and accompanying text (discussing traffic-stop estimates). 
264  Other scholars note that the routine versions of these checks almost always take a few minutes. 
Stopping officers also often conduct warrant queries, which can take anywhere from “a few minutes to 
ten minutes to thirty minutes.” LaFave, supra note 262, at 1877 (footnotes omitted). Warrant review by 
a magistrate, on the other hand, generally takes about three minutes. See VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra 
note 122, at 26. While requiring warrants in the traffic-stop context would undoubtedly require 
streamlining some common elements for preparation and utilizing available technology for presentation, 
actual review of the warrant would take less time than some of the computer checks currently used. 
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off claims against officers and police forces.265 Yet, this very same 
technology, supplemented by police officers’ audio dictation, could be used 
to create an ex ante record of why police are going to conduct searches and 
arrests. 
It would be a simple matter for police to record the reasons for actions 
they are about to take, while video would confirm the accuracy of the 
underlying factual predicate. Most of this audio and video would never be 
scrutinized, but it would available to defense counsel in cases in which 
there was some doubt about the sufficiency of police reasons for action. 
And, as with the warrant process, the existence of this record would 
undoubtedly lead to a certain amount of police self-screening. 
CONCLUSION 
The edifice of constitutional search and seizure is premised on 
deterrence, yet the deterrence model does not work. In other areas of the 
law, when ex post deterrence fails, the law turns to ex ante alternatives. The 
same should be true in the Fourth Amendment context. We should return to 
a model in which officers seek ex ante permission—warrants—before 
searching and seizing, whenever practicable. Theory and evidence from 
social science suggest we will get better and more constitutional decisions 
this way; available data confirms the benefits. True, this model imposes the 
need to process many more warrant requests. But there is reason to believe 
the capacity exists or easily could be added. And data from Pittsburgh 
suggest that if warrants were too onerous, even a requirement of officers 
recording the basis for searches before proceeding would obtain many of 
the benefits of warrants as deterrents. 
 
 
265  See Goode, supra note 19. 
